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well, and then to be by him delivered to Hurff. January 2d 1874,
the sheriff, John tfires, under an execution against Heritage, issued
out of the Circuit Court, levied upon the five hundred bushels of
corn, which still remained, in bulk, in the actual possession of Heritage. Soon after the levy on the corn by the sheriff, Heritage
delivered to Hurff two hundred bushels, according to their agreement, and the action was brought by the sheriff against Hurff to
recover the value of this corn, after demand made of him and refusal to re-deliver the same.
Upon these facts, proven by the testimony of both Heritage and
Hurff, the defendant's counsel requested the court to charge the
jury that if Hurff and Heritage, at the time of the sale of the corn,
intended and understood the sale to be complete, that then the property passed, at that time, to Hurff, and the plaintiff could not recover its value for his refusal to return it after it was separated and
delivered to him by Heritage. The court refused so to charge and
instructed the jury that notwithstanding Hurff bought and paid for
two hundred bushels of Heritage's corn before there was any levy
upon it by Sheriff Hires, yet as it appeared that it was in bulk with
6ther corn, and not separated at the time of the sale, or prior' to
the levy by the sheriff, no property in the corn passed to Hurff,
but remained in the defendant in execution, was bound by the levy
of the sheriff subsequently made, and that the defendant was liable
to the sheriff for the value of the corn delivered by Heritage to him
after such levy.
The defendant's counsel excepted, and this writ of error was
brought.

1). J. Pancoat, for the plaintiff in error.
I. L. Slape, for the defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCUDDER, J.-The facts being admitted, the single question is
presented, whether there was any evidence from which the jury
might infer that the parties to the contract for the sale of the two
hundred bushels of -corn intended that the sale should be complete
and executed, or whether, upon the admitted facts, the sale was incomplete and the contract merely executory.
This question is so important in its relation to the business of
merchants and others in buying and selling the various commodities
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which are the objects of trade, that it is not strange there should be
many conflicts and nice distinctions found in the books in determining the rights of the parties.
It is desirable that the law affecting sales should be as fixed and
well defined is the nature of the case will admit, that all may know
it and deal securely with reference to such law. Yet there is
scarcely a subject in the law which conflicting decisions.have left in
greater uncertainty.
The ordinary rule is, that the property in a chattel passes according to the intention of the parties. In determining such intention
in a contract of sale, it is admitted that it is a question of fact for
the jury, under proper instructions, and must be submitted to them,
unless it is plain, as matter of law, that the evidence will justify a
finding but one way: Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Bangs, 102 Mass.
291; De Ridder v. MeKnight, 13 Johns. 294.
It was held by the court below that the evidence in this case will
justify a finding but one way, and they so instructed the jury.
Was this charge correct?
It is a fundamental principle pervading everywhere the doctrine
of sales of chattels, that if goods be sold by number, weight or measure, the sale is incomplete, and the risk continues in' the seller
until the specific property be separated and identified: 2 Kent's
Com. 496.
It does not alter the principle that the payment for the goods has
been made in whole or in part; nor that they are unfit for delivery
at the time of sale. * To overcome the presumption that the sale is
incomplete and executory, there must be some further act of the
parties to express the intention that the title shall be complete and
executed. There must be some delivery, or attempt at delivery,
some separation, or attempt at separation, or some clearly-expressed
purpose, to show that in the minds of the parties the sale was executed; otherwise, under the rule above stated, the sale is incomplete.
A brief consideration of some of the cases will show that this
principle is firmly established, and its admission will reconcile
much of the apparent conflict between them. I know no better
statement of it than that made by BAYLEY, J., in Gillett v. Hill,
2 C. & M. 530, in these words: "Where there is a bargain for a
certain quantity ex a greater quantity, and there is a power of selection in the vendor to deliver which he thinks fit, then the right to
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them does not pass to the vendee until the vendor has made his
selection, and trover is not maintainable until that is done. If I
agree to deliver a certain quantity of oil, as ten tons out of eighteen
tons, no one can say which part of the whole quantity I liave agreed
to deliver until a selection is made. There is no individuality until
it has been divided."
In Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cush. 573, two hundred and fifty
barrels of pork were sold, part of a larger lot, all of the same quality, having the same marks, and all -stored in the vendor's cellar,
but no separation was made. The purchasers gave their negotiable
promissory notes in payment of the barrels bought. It was held
that as there had been no possession on the part of the purchaser,
and no separation of the barrels from a larger mass of articles
similar in kind, and no descriptive marks to designate them, that
no title passed. Many cases are reviewed and distinguished in
the opinion of the court.
Mr. Benjamin, in his Book on Sales (§,354), says that the only
case to be found in the reports in apparent contradiction to this
principle of the law of sales is Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East 614.
He adds that this case, notwithstanding explanations by the judges
who took part in the decision made in subsequent cases, is scarcely
ever mentioned without suggestion of doubt or disapproval.
But that case differs from the one we are considering, in that the
purchaser of the forty tons of oil, in bulk, sold to a third person
and gave an order for delivery, which was accepted; while here it
was expressly agreed there should be no delivery or separation until
a future time. The oil was also in the custody of another, and
not left in the possession of the seller, as in this case.
Whitehouse v. Frost has been followed by several cases in this
country. Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, is one often cited.
Here there was a sale of six thousand bushels of grain from a
greater quantity. A written receipt was given for the six thousand
bushels sold from a greater quantity in store, subject to the order
of the purchaser free of all charges on board.. There was a bill
of sale and a writing that the seller held as bailee of the purchaser. The case was decided upon the principle that where the parties to a sale of goods so situated expressly declare an intentiou
to change the title, there is no legal impossibility in the way of that
design.
Foot v. Marsh, 51 N. Y. 288, states the distinction between that

HIRES v. HURFF.

case and Kimberly v. Patcldn. There was an agreement for a
sale to the plaintiffs of one hundred barrels of oil, by the sample
then exhibited, for which the plaintiffs were to give their note at
three months, and as the barrels contained different quantities, in
order to ascertain the amount for which the note should be given,
it was agreed that each barrel should contain an average of forty
gallons, in all four thousand gallons, and that they should be subject to twenty shillings storage until called for. When the plaintiffs called for the oil the defendants delivered one hundred barrels,
containing eighteen hundred and eighty-one gallons. The diminution was caused by leakage. In an action to recover the deficiency, it was held that the contract was executory, not executed,
and the plaintiffs could recover the amount specified in the contract.
In Bussell v. Carrington,42 N. Y. 118, there was a sale of part
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fested an intent to pass the title, and rendered the transaction an
executed contract, without actual separation or delivery of the property. The grain was not in the actual possession of the seller,
but of his agent; the order upon the agent and acceptance by him
was all the delivery that could conveniently be made, and the grain
after the order was given and accepted, was not in the possession
nor under the control of the seller, nor was there anything further
for him to do. In the latter case, the distinction is well stated
between that and the class of cases where the vendor himself'
retains the possession, because there is something more to be done by
him, such as measuring, weighing or marking as where an entire
bulk is delivered to the vendee in order that he may make the separation himself. It was also said in this case, that a tenancy in
common resulted from the method of storing in the elevator, which
had been agreed upon by the parties, and superseded the necessity
of measuring, weighing or separating the part sold. The peculiar
position of grain in elevators, the mixed property of different owners
stored in large quantities, the convenience and necessity of selling
while in storage for future shipments and for advances, may require
some modification by custom of the rule that has been applied to
ordinary cases of sales of smaller quantities from the mass.
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Chapman v. Shepard, 39 Conn. 413, goes to the extent that the
rule of law, that upon the sale of a portion of a large bulk, the contract remains, in judgment of law, executory until the portion sold
is seiered and separated for the purchaser from the mass, is limited
to cases where the articles differ from each other in quantity, quality or value, so that they must be selected to be distinguished, and
does not apply to cases of sales of part of an ascertained mass
of uniform quality and value. See also Waldron v. Chase, 37
Me. 414, which is qualified and distinguished in the latter case
of Morrison v. -Dingley,63 Me. 553, where the simple fundamental
rule applicable to sales of chattels not specific is clearly asserted.
In our state the general principle was incidentally referred to in
Thompson v. Conover, 3.Vroom 466, and more directly in Boswell
v. Green, 1 Dutcher 390. In the latter case there was a sale by
debtors to a creditor of all their coal lying upon a wharf, by a bill
of sale, an order for delivery accepted, and possession given by the
-wharfingers prior to a levy by the sheriff at the suit of other creditors. This sale was clearly completed within all the cases that
have been cited. A like case is Macomber v. Parker, 13 Pick.
175.
The conclusion to which all the cases tend is, that where there
is a contract for the sale of a certain quantity of goods, in general
a smaller from a greater quantity in bulk, without a special identification of them or an appropriation of them to the contract, it is
an executory agreement, and the property does not pass until such
appropriation is made, unless there be a clearly-expressed intention
to make the sale of the articles complete and absolute: Campbell
v. .'JIersey -Docks, 14 C. B. N. S. 412; Aldridge v. Johnson, 7
E. & B. 885; Young v. Matthews, L. R. 2 C. P. 127; garti•neau v. Kitcling, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436; Biddle v. Varnum, 20
Pick. 280; Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490; 1 Pars. on Cont.,
§ 527; Story on Sales, § 352, &c.; Hilliard on Sales, 135-147;
Benjamin on Sales, §§ 310, 334, 352, &c.; 2 Schouler's Pers.
Prop. 244, &c.
In the present case, the two hundred bushels of corn were to
remain in bulk, and an undistinguished part of the five hundred
bushels, until they were hardened; then they were to be weighed
or measured and delivered by the vendor to the vendee. There
was no bill of sale, no receipt, no delivery, no statement as to whose
should be the risk, no special appropriation, no fact but payment
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to indicate a purpose to make an immediate and absolute sale of the
corn. There were, therefore, no facts in the case from which a
jury could legally infer that the contract was complete in"lai.*

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
If any one were to infer from the
principal case that the point decided is
free from doubt he would make a great
mistake. Roughly speaking, the conditions necessary to a completed sale, i.
e., one which will pass the property in
chattels from the vendor to the vendee,
are that the subject of the sale is agreed
upon and in existence ; that the vendor
has the right of property and is competent to transfer it, and finally that the
intention of the parties that it shall be
transferred is clear. The proposition
thus stated is in practice further qualified, where the 17th section of the StatUte of Frauds is in force by the requirement that the sale must be in writing
or earnest must be given, or there must
be a partial delivery and acceptance;
and everywhere by the requirement
that it must not be in fraud of the vendor's creditors ; and finally, if delivery
has not been actually made to the vendee, the sale is subject to the vendor's
right, in case the vendee becomes insolvent before payment, to retain the goods
or stop them in transita for the price.
But these rules, although they have often
been decisive of the ownership of goods,
have nothing to do with the question,
whether title has passed, because they
operate upon the validity of the contract
irrespective of title at all, being rules of
public policy extinguishing titles in certain cases whether actually made out or
not. We call attention to this difference
at the outset because the observance
of it relieves the cases of much perplexity: Winslow v. Lconard, 12 Harris
(Pa.) 14.
It may be said generally that the cases
upon the passage of property in chattels
have arisen either where the subject of
sale has been destroyed or where the
buyer or seller has become insolvent
VOL. XXVI.-3

before payment or before delivery. The
question whether the property has passed
being one of intention, has been most
difficult to solve in the class first mentioned, because both parties to the contract being solvent and equally meritorious are eager to escape loss, but when
one of the parties is insolvent and the
dispute is whether he shall pay the other
in full or only a dividend the real intention is easier arrived at. The question
whether the parties intended that the
property should pass like any other
fact is for the jury: De Ridder v.
McKnight, 13 Johns. 294; Bank v.
Bangs, 102 Mass. 294; unless the facts
are such that no intention to do so could
be inferred from them when the court
would be justified in instructing the jury,
as was done in the principal case, to
find a verdict upon the law.
The cases in which it has been held
that the property cannot have been intended to pass, are divided into two
classes :1. Where something remains to be
done by the vendor, as to make, alter, or
complete the subject of sale ; because,
until it has been put in the condition
agreed upon it is not the thing sold, and
therefore the buyer has no property in
it ; the sale is not complete.
2. Where the subject of sale is part
of a larger quantity, as one hundred
out of five hundred head of cattle ; because, until it has been separated and
specified, there is nothing to show what
part has been sold.
Both these classes of contracts are
construed to be agreements to deliver
articles of a certain description which
would be complied with by any answering the description. This note is devoted to the consideration of cases of the
second class.
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In llhte, Assignee, v. Wilks, 5 Taunt.
176 (1813), the bankrupt bought twenty
tons of oil from the defendant, to be paid
for in four days by his acceptance, and
to be delivered in one month. A bill
was presented, hut before acceptance the
purchaser failed. In this action of trover by the assignee, it appeared that
the defendant had several cisterns of oil
and the bankrupt did not know out of
which his was to come. The court held
there had been no complete sale of property and no particular oil had passed
to the bankrupt, and therefore his assignee could not maintain trover.
_Iutchjwson v. Uunter, 7 Barr 140
(1847).
hlunter bought one hundred
barrels of molasses from one Poindexter, who had two hundred and fifty
stored in his cellar, of different quantities
and values. It was agreed to settle on
a gauge of forty gallons to the barrelthe true amount to be determined afterwards-aud a note was given for the
price. Hunter sold the one hundred
barrels he had in Poindexter's cellar to
Hutchinson, at thirty-two cents a gallon
cash, and offered to turn them out and
gauge them. Before the money was
paid the molasses was destroyed, and
this action of assumpsit was brought to
recover the price. ROGERS, J., held
that no property had passed, and concludes, "It will be observed that the
case is put entirely on the fact that the
barrels were of unequal quantities and
values and had not been separated from
the molasses still owned by the vendor.
That the molasses was not gauged does
not enter into the consideration of the
court in determining the defendant's
liability to the action. In Woods v.
McGee, 7 Ohio 467 (1836), which is
emphatic in making severance a condition precedent to property in any part,
it is to be observed that the one thousand
-ive hundred barrels of flour, for three
hundred of which trover was brought,
differed in value from twenty-five cents
to fifty cents per barrel. Fo,t v. Marsh,
51 N. Y. 288 (1873), the defendant

bought and paid for one hundred barrels
of oil, to contain four thousand gallons
like sample, out of one hundred and
fifty of three different qualities. When
delivered there had been a great leakage,
and this action was brought to recover
damages for it. The court sustained
the action on the ground that the agreement was to deliver four thousand gallons of oil, and gave as one of the reasons
why property had not passed to the purchaser in any part, that the whole was
composed of various qualities.
Where there is any difference between
the articles composing the whole of
which a part is sold, it is quite clear
that there remains a right of selection
which would prevent property passing
in any particular thing to the vendee.
In such a case there is nothing for a
jury to pass on, because intention to
make a completed sale could not be infervod. In this way many decisions
like those just quoted could be disposed
of on grounds satisfactory to every one,
in which the courts have used language
more sweeping than the facts required,
viz., that severance is necessary in all
cases to pass the property in a part of
a larger quantity.
In one case the court carried the
power of the parties to pass property, if
they intended to do so, so far as to allow
the purchaser of one hundred head of
cattle out of a Iferd of four thousand to
maintain trover for them: lVatts v.
llendry, 13 Fla. 526 (1871); the defendant, who was the purchaser of a
herd of cattle out of which the plaintiff
had already bought one hundred two
year old steers, notified him to select
and drive them away by a given day
or he would not recognise his right to
do so. The plaintiff not having done it
within the time set, brought this action
of trover, which the court sustained, because the defendant had admitted his property in any one hundred cattle of the description named which he might select.
But where there is absolutely no difference between the parts composing the
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whole, as in the case of money, oil,
wine, grain, coal, &c., the importance
of selection disappears, and the violence
of the legal presumption that the parties
could not have intended a transfer of the
property is proportionately weakened.
Of this class was the noted case of Whitehouse, Assignee, v. Frost, 12 East 614
(1810). The bankrupt was the sub-vendee of ten tons of oil, part of forty tons
contained in the same cistern. He had
received from his vendor at order upon
the original owners in whose custody it
remained to deliver the oil to him, which
they had accepted. Before payment he
failed, and this action of trover was
brought by his assignee against his vendor and the custodian of the oil. LE
BLANC, J., said, "But something, it is
said, still remained to be done, -namely,
the measuring off of the ten tons from the
rest of the oil. Nothing, however, remained to be done to complete the sale.
The objection only applies where something remains to be done, as between the
buyer and seller, or for the purpose of
ascertaining either the quantity or the
price, neither of which remained to be
done in this case, for it was admitted by
the persons who were to make the delivery to Townsend that the quantity
mentioned in the order was in the cistern in their custody, for they had before
sold that quantity to the Frosts, of
whom Townsend purchased it, and
bad received the price. Therefore,
though something remained to be done
as between the vendee and the persons
who retained the custody of the oil, before the vendee could be put -into separate possession of the part sold, yet as
between him and his vendors nothing
remained to perfect the sale."
Jackson v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 25
(1811), was a case of trover for 1969
Spanish dollars, belonging to the plaintiff out of a barrel containing $4718,
consigned to one Laycock, who had used
the proceeds as a credit in their account
with the defendantsp their bankers.

MxsrELD, C. J., said : "It appears

that no separation was ever made from
the whole quantity of $1969 belonging
to the plaintiff. And an objection has
been taken on that ground against the
form of the action. Bat we think there.
isno difficulty in that point. The defendant has disposed of all the dollars;
consequently he has disposed of those
which belong to the plaintiffs, and as
.all are of the same value it cannof be a
question which particular dollars are
his.2"

In Kimberly v.Patcin, 19 N. Y. 330
(1859), the owner of a large quantity
of wheat sold six thousand bushels of
itto A., who left it in his possession
and received a warehouse receipt. A.
sold the bill
of sale and warehouse receipt to the defendant. Subsequently,
the owner sold the whole pile to the
plaintiff, and the defendant replevied
six thousand bushels. It was held that
there being no legal impossibility in
two persons being tenants in common
of a quantity of wheat, the bill of sale
and warehouse receipt showed that it
was the intention of the parties to create
this relation or something like it,
and
the owner became a bailee for A. or his
assigns of six thousand bushels, out of
the whole quantity, inwhich the plaintiff
had property and could maintain
replevin. Also, Russell v. Carrington,
42 N. Y. 118 (1870).
For an excellent statement of the position that severance isnot necessary to
an executed sale of a part of a uniform
whole ifthe parties intended to pass the
property, see' C aman v. Shepard, 39
Conn. 413 (1872) ; Waldron v. Cliase,
37 Me. 414 (1854); Pleasantsv7.
Pendlelon, 6 Rand. 475.
As we have seen that many cases, in
which much was said about the want of
severance and appropriation, might have
rested on-the fact of the difference between the articles composing the whole
in quantity, quality or value, so there
are many such which might as easily
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and more satisfactorily have been rested
upon the right of the vendor to retain
for the price, the vendee being insolvent
or on the fact that there remained something for the vendor to do before the
things sold could be considered to be in
a deliverable state.
lVallace. Assignee, v. Breeds, 13 East
522 (1811). Trover for fifty tons of
oil at ninety and order for delivery accepted by wharfinger. Before delivery
the purchaser failed and the seller countermanded the order to deliver which
had been accepted by the wharfinger.
Besides, it appeared to be the constant
custom before Greenland oil is delivered
"to have the casks searched by a cooper
employed by the seller, and it is also
the custom for a broker on behalf both
of the buyer and seller to attend to make
a minute of the foot-dirt and water in
each cask, and the casks are then filled
up by the seller's cooper at the seller's
expense,. and delivered in a'complete
state, containing the quantity sold, none
of -which circumstances had taken place
at the time of the countermand."
Bush v. Davis, 2 Maule & Sel. 398
(1814), was trover for ten tons of flax,
part of eighteen owned by the plaintiffs
and in the possession of the defendant as
wharfinger. The plaintiff sold the ten
tons to one Bromer, and gave him a
delivery order, which was accepted by
the defendant. Before actual delivery
Bromer failed and the plaintiffs countermanded the order. The flax was in
mats, and in order io deliver ten tons it
might be necessary to break a mat, and
it would be certainly necessary to calculate the tare upon the weight of the mats
and ropes, and the draft upon the number of the mats. Held, no property
pnsied, because something remained for
the vendor to do before the flax would
be in a deliverable state.
Shlpleyv. Davis, 5 Taunt. 617 (1814),
was a case in the Common Pleas, raising exactly the same point as Bush v.

Davis, supra, did in the Queen's Bench,
and was similarly decided.
Aldridge v. Johnsoti, 7 El. & B31.885
(1857). The plaintiff bought and
partly paid for one hundred quarts of
barley out of two hundred quarts owned
by one K., and was to send his own
sacks for it, which K. was to fill and
deliver. After K. had filled some sacks
he emptied them back, and then becoming bankrupt, the defendant, his assignee, removed the whole quantity.
This was trover by the plaintiff for one
hundred-quarts. Held, that property
had passed to the plaintiff in the barley
which had been put in his'sacks, but not
in the balance. Langton v. Higgins, 4
H. & N. 402, raised precisely the same
point as to the sale of a crop of peppermint oil, and was decided in the same
way: Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490
(1873).
Even though the view that severance
is not a legal -necessity be adopted, yet
it remains to inquire whether the parties
really did intend that the property should
pass. It was held that they did not intend to do so in Golder v. Ogden, 3 Harris (Pa.) 530 (1850). Girsom, C. J.,
construed the contract for 'two thousand pieces of wall paper, the seller of
which having been paid in full made an
assignment after he had delivered one
thousand, to be a contract to furnish two
thousand pieces of a certain description,
and none at all having been pointed out
specifically or in gross dny pieces would
have fulfilled it.
Ikaldeman v. Duncan t 1 P. F. Smith
66 (1865). Duncan bought and paid
for three hundred barrels of oil from
Haldeman. The following was the bill
of sale:"Messrs. Duncan & Williams,
Bought of William Haldemau three
hundred barrels of crude oil in good,
new barrels, and in good condition.
Said oil to be clear from water and
slush, and to be about 440 gravity.
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Said oil to be delivered at Oil City,
ready for shipment on first water, at
$12.871 per barrel, $3862.50."
At the time of the sale, Haldeman
pointed out to Duncan a larger quantity
of oil and told him to select his barrels.
Duncan tested some of them and declared
himself satisfied, but went away without
selecting or separating the amount he
had purchase.d. All this oil was destroyed before the actual delivery of any
to Duncan, but Haldeman contended
that the property in three hundred barrels of the larger lot had passed to him.
READ, J., thought that the evidence
showed no selection or intention to select
and that there was therefore no delivery.
Morrison v. Disgley, 63 Ale. 553
(1874). The court regarded the facts
that there had been no payment by the
vendees and no bill of sale, accepted
delivery, order or warehouse receipt on
the part of the vendors, as proving that
they could not have intended to give up
They expressly disthe property.
claimed any intention of qualifying the
doctrine of the earlier case of Waldroa
v. Chase, supra.
A good deal'of inconclusive reasoning upon this subject has passed current
in high quarters. It has been thought
that if the part sold is in the possession
of a third party and not of the seller
that a sale may be made without severance, because the third party becomes
the bailee of the sub-vendee. But bailee
of what7 Of nothing more exact, specific or defindd, more capable of sale,
than before the second transaction was
made. Again, courts have been very
much influenced by the circumstance
that the seller or his bailee has accepted an order for delivery or has
given a warehouse receipt. But the
question recurs, of what ? Of nothing in
the least more exact or defined because
of that fact.. These circumstances do
have weight as showing the intention of
the parties to make a completed sale, but

then this confirms the doctrine that the
.parties-may do so-without severance if
their intention is clear, and not the opposite doctrine they are relied on to
support: Both these positions are mentioned with approval in the principal
case.
2 Cr. & Mee: 530
In Gillett v. M1111,
(1834), the plaintiff had received from
0. an order upon the -defendant, a
wharfinger, to deliver him twenty sacks
of flour. The defendant accepted it and
This was an
delivered five sacks.
action of trover for the remaining fifteen. It appeared that the defendant
had in his possession a much larger
number of O.'s sacks, and that there had
been no severance or selection for the
order held by the plaintiff. But the
court were of opinion that property had
passed to him and. he could maintain
trover because the acceptance did not
show the twenty sacks to be a part of
a larger number. The answer to this
is that if severance be necessary to a
sale he had no property and could, therefore, not maintain trover. Of course
he would have a remedy against the
wharfinger in damages for not complying with his acceptance, as was held in
Austin v. Craven, 4 Taunt. 644, in
which one Kruse had bought and the
defendant agreed to deliver fifty hundred-weight of sugar known as double
loaves, not pointed out or even in existence. Kruse sold to the plaintiff and
gave him an order on the defendant to
deliver, which was accepted. Kruse
was then paid by the plaintiff, but before
paying the defendant became insolvent
and the defendant refused to deliver to
the plaintiff, who brought an action of
trover, which the court held could not be
maintained because it required property
in some particular sugar, whereas the
sugar sold was not in existence.
So in Whitehouse v. Frost, .upra, the
court gave weight to the fact that the
plaintiff was a sub-vendee, and that
everything had been done between him
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nd his vendor that could be done, intimating that if his vendor had been
plaintiff against the custodian of the oil
the case would have been different.
But how could the vendor give the subvendee any better title than he had himself, and if severance were necessary to
title between him and the custodian,
why not between him and his subvendee ?
In Russell v. Carrington, supra, the
court thought the circumstance that the
grain was in the elevator of a third
party greatly relieved the question of
embarrassment about severance. How
this could make the plaintiff's title any
better, so far as the question of severance is concerned, it is not easy to see.
Crfoot v. Bennett, 2 Comst. 258
(1849).
Trespass for taking bricks
September 2d. One Horace Crofoot
transferred all the bricks in a new kiln
to the defendant, out of which he was
to take forty-three thousand. On October 6th he gave a bill of sale to his
brother, Sylvester Crofoot, for all the
bricks in the new kiln. Subsequently,
the defendant opened the new kiln and
took away forty-three thousand bricks.
Held, that property had passed to the
defendant in the forty-three thousand,
because delivery of all had been made
to him from which to select, otherwise,
no separation having been made, property would not have passed. But if
property would nothave passed by a sale
of the forty-three thousand for want of
severance, the defect could not be cured
by a symbolical delivery of the whole
kiln, because that was for the purpose
of severance of part, which had not
taken place when the sale was made to
Sylvester Crofoot of the whole.
The Massachusetts decisions are irreconcilable. In Gardner v. Dutch, 9
Mass. 427 (1812), Gardner, the plaintiff, master of a trading ship, brought
home a cargo of coffee to the owners,
Wellman & Ropes. He was entitled to
seventy-six bags as his share of the ad-

venture, for which they gave him a
receipt on receiving the cargo. The
defendant, a deputy sheriff, had levied
upon the whole quantity, and the plaintiff brought this action of replevin for
his seventy.six bags. It was objected
that at best the plaintiff was but tenant
in common wiih Wellman & Ropes, and
could not, therefore, maintain replevin,
but the court briefly said, that as he
could have selected any seventy-six bags
in the hands of Wellman & Ropes, he
could do so when in the hands of the
sheriff.
Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cush. 579
(1853), was an action of replevin for
one hundred and fifty barrels of pork
by the sub-vendee, who presented a
delivery order for it from his vendor to
the defendant, which was accepted, -but
his vendor having in the meantime
failed, the defendant refused to deliver,
on the ground that he bad not been
paid. The court held the action could
not be maintained, because there had
been no specific appropriation.
It would be very hard to reconcile
this case with Gardner v. Dutch, or
with Cushing et al. v. Breed et al., 14
Allen 376 (1867), which was an action
to recover the price of five hundred
bushels of corn sold and delivered.The plaintiff, being the owner of a
cargo of grain, stored in an elevator
belonging to third parties, sold five
hundred bushels to defendant, and gave
them an order in the following terms:
"Please deliver Breed & Co., or order,
five hundred bushels black oats, from
cargo per schooner Seven Brothers,
storage commencing to the person or
persons in whose favor this order is
drawn, June 29th 1864," which was
accepted by the elevator. After delivery
of one hufidred and five bushels the rest
was burned. Held, property in the corn
had passed, because the contract changed
the relation of the elevator from agent
of the vendor to agent of the vendee,
and the possession of the agent being
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that of the principal, the corn was delivered. It was distinguished from the
class of cases where the vendor retains
possession, because there is something
further for him to do. But the bailee
was after the second transaction as before, bailee of an unascertained part of
the whole, and if severance were necessary to the passing of property it had
not gone into the defendant.
In regard to these distinctions it is
difficult to see why, if the plaintiff
when in possession of the cargo could
not have given title to a part of it for
want of severance be could do so any
better when his agent was in possession.
It will be remembered that in Scudder
v. Worster, the person who sold to the
sub-vendee was not in possession, and
accordingly the acceptance of the delivery order by the person in possession
ought to have passed the title to the subvendee.
The judicial progress takes another
turn in Weld v. Cutler, 2 Gray 196
(1854), which was an action against
Cutler, assignee of A., for the conversion of two hundred tons of coal. The
plaintiff had been put in possession as
mortgagee of a pile of coal containing
five hundred tons to sell two hundred.
Before any severance, A. became insolvent and his assignee sold the coal.
The court distinguished the case from
Scudder v. Worster by saying, as was
said in Crofoot v. Bennett, supra, that
the delivery of the whole pile passed
the property. But the delivery was to
sell two hundred tons and there having
been no severance or identification,
how, consistently with former rulings,
could property have passed ? It may
not be easy to reconcile the Massachusetts cases with each other or with the
principle which they profess to maintain
that severance is necessary to pass property, but the practical result of them
keeps pace with modern wants and
manners. Even there the rule of Scudder v. IMorster is not applied to the ele-

vators and warehouses which are playing
so important a part in modern commerce.
It could not be maintained without great
injury to merchants that a bill of sale
and elevator receipt does not give title
to the grain called for. See also on
this subject I Pars. on Cont., see. 527 ;
Addison on Contracts, p. 453 ; Blackburn on the Contract of Sale *122;
Benjamin on Sales, sects. 334 and 352;
Parsons on Mercantile Law, p. 48.
* Examined in the light of what has
been said, the principal case is not a
satisfactory one. In a few brief words
it intimates that "a clearly-expressed
intention to make the 'sale of the articles
complete and absolute" might pass the
property in a part of a greater quantity
without special identification or appropriation. Yet the judgment amounts in
the whole swing and conclusion of it to
an emphatic declaration of the principle
that such severance is a legal necessity.
At the trial the defendant's counsel
requested the court to charge "that
if Hurff & Heritage, at the time of the
sale of the corn, intended and understood
the sale to be complete, that then the
property passed at that time to Hurff
and the plaintiff could not recover its
value for his refusal to return it after
it was separated and delivered to him by
Heritage," which the court refused to
do and this ruling is sustained. If
intention to make a completed sale could
have done it this was one. The vendor
and vendee concurred in testifying to a
sale in every way complete. Importance should not have been given to the
circumstance that the wheat was to
remain in the hands of the vendor until
it should harden, because that was a
privilege of the vendee entirely consistent with his right to immediate possession. That there must be weighing
and measuring before delivery will not
prevent property passing in an article
unless it is necessary to identification :
Riddle v. Varnun, 20 Pick. 283; Turicy v. Bates, 2 Hurlst. & C. 200; Mar-
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Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
PERRY v. WHEELER ET AL.
Civil courts cannot re-judge the judgmeht of an ecclesiastical tribunal in matters
within tile latter's jurisdiction; but the -decision of such tribunal upon its own
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is bot exclusive. ' The control of the civil
courts over the civil rights of the citizens cannot be ousted.
A board of reference under canon. 4 of the Protestant Episcopal Church is an
ecclesiastical court, and the civil courts 'may inquire into its organization and
decide whether it has acted within the scope of its constitutional authority.
The word "permanently." as used in the call of a rector, means indefinitely,
and constitutes a contract that he should continue to hold the office of rector til
one or the other of the parties desires to terminate the relation, and then to be
terminated after reasonable notice and with the approval of the ecclesiastical
authority of the diocese.
Certain canons of the Episcopal Church construed.
The decisions:of the state courts upon the rights of parties under state laws are
final and binding upon the federal courts, and a decision of the latter, which is
in opposition to the cofistruction of state laws given by the highest court of the
state, will not be regarded by the state courts.
"adsonv. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, reviewed and dissented from.

•
was an action by Perry to recover salary alleged"to be due
him by defendants. The facts were substantially as follows: On
September 1st 1866 the wardens and vestry of Grace Church at
Ilopkinsville, Ky., addressed a letter to plaintiff in the following
words
"Dear Sir: By the unanimous vote of the members of Grace
Church, Hopkinsville, taken at a meeting held on Thursday last,
the vestry were authorized to submit the following to your consideration:"Be it resolved, and hereby it is resolved, that the Rev. G. B.
Perry, D. D., be, and hereby is, elected permanently to the rectorship of Grace Church, Hopkinsville, at a salary of dollars
per annum, to be paid quarterly, each quafter respectively in
advance, with, the free use also of rectory grounds, as soon as
vacated by present occupant.
"Resolved, that said blank in regard to salary be hereafter
filled."
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The proposition. was accepted in writing by plaintiff, and in May
1868 the vestry passed a resolution that the annual salary of plaintiff should be "not less than $600, -to commence at the lbeginning
of the church year of his settlement as pastor."
In August 1871, a resolution, was adopted by the vestry to the.
effect that for the year ending September 1st 1872 Dr. Perry
should receive the sum of not less thn $500. The adoption of
this resolution resulted in a controversy between the rector and his
congregation, and the breach continued to widen until finally apllication was made, by persons represenfing. the congregation, to the
bishop of the diocese, for the appdintment of a board of reference to
investigate the facts, and to determine whether or. not it was possible to terminate the controversy, and, if not, to prescribe the terms
upon which a dissolution of the relations existing between the rector
and the congregation should be bad.
The board was appointed. It met and organized at Hopkinsville, February 7th 1872. It determined that a dissolution was
necessary, and rendered this judgment or recommendation:
"And we do hereby recommend that such dissolution should take
effect on the 1st day of March 1872, upon the follow'ing terms, to
wit:"1. That the vestry or congregation pay to Dr. Perry all arrears
due on his salary up to the 1st of September 1871, counting such
salary to be $600 per annum.
"2. That Dr. Perry be allowed the use of the rectory and
grounds attached thereto up to the 1st of June 1872.
"These conditions we would make mandatory. In addition to
these, we would request and reconInzend to the vestry that they
should pay to Dr. Perry at the same rate of $600 per annm uip to
the 1st of March 1872, while we make it iniperative that they sall
pay him at the rate of ;500 per annum from September 1st 1871
to MNarch 1st 1872."
This finding was signed by four of the board of reference and
was reported to and approved by the bishop. Dr. Perry declined
to surrender the rectory and grounds, and declined to acknowledge
the binding obligation of the action of the board as construed by the
bishop, and the result was, his suspension from the right to exercise clerical and ministerial functions within this diocese, until his
alleged contumacious disobedience should cease.
Matters remained in this condition until July 1875, when Dr.
Perry instituted'this action, claiming that the wardens, vestry and
Vol. XXVI.-4
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congregation were indebted to him for salary due and in arrears in
the sum of over $3000, and seeking to have the rectory and grounds
held and owned by the church subject to the judgment of his claim.
The facts touching the dissolution of the relationship between Dr.
Perry and the congregation were set up by the defendants in their
answer. It was averred that the sum of money due to Dr. Perry
by the terms of the finding of board of reference had been tendered
him, and that he had refused to accept the tender, and, by way of
cross-action, they alleged that he had wrongfully withheld the possession of the rectory and grounds from the 1st day of June 1872,
up to the time at which they answered, and'they prayed that he
should be charged with reasonable rents therefor, and that said
rents should be set off against any claim he might have for arrearages of salary. The reply of Dr. Perry raised a proper issue as
to this claim. The cause was submitted, and ajudgment rendeied,
requiring the appellant to surrender the rectory and grounds, and
setting off rents against the sum awarded him by the board of reference, and dismissing his petition. To reverse that judgment he
prosecuted this appeal.
Ritter ,&Payne, and McPherson
Petree

Champlin, for appellant.

lLittell, and Campbell & .Ferguson,for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDsAY, C. J.-Appellant, by his counsel, insists that he was
the permanent rector of Grace Church, and had the right to retain
his position during life, unless he should become incapacitated for
the performance of clerical duties by age or disease, or unless he
should disqualify himself by immoral or unchristian conduct, or by
the abandonment of the faith and the practices of the Protestant
lEpiscopal Church. He certainly was elected permanent rector,
but we do not understand the term permanent, as used in the call,
to mean that the parties were to be bound together by ties to be dissolved only by mutual consent, or for sufficient legal or ecclesiastical
reasons. A connection of that character might, and in some cases
probably would, result in compelling an unwilling pastor to remain
with his congregation, or a dissatisfied congregation to retain and
pay an unpopular and distasteful minister, after the feelings of
estrangement had become so intense that the continuance of the
pastoral relation would tend to tear down and destroy, rather than
to preserve or build up, the cause of Christianity, and the moral
and religious interests of the local church.
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We understand that Dr. Perry was called as the rector of the
church for an indefinite period, and that it was intended he should
continue to hold the place until one or the other of the contracting
parties should desire to terminate the connection, in which case the
dissatisfied party was to have the right to be relieved of further
obligations to the other, upon fair equitable terms, and after reasonable notice, and with the concurrence or approval of the ecclesiastical authority of the diocese.
Appellant denies that he is any way bound by the action of the
board of reference. This board was composed of but four of the five
presbyters appointed, and he insists that, by the canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church, the presence and participation of five
members are indispensably necessary to constitute a legal and constitutional tribunal of that character.
Upon the other hand, it is claimed that this is not a proper question for the consideration of the secular courts, that they have no
right to inquire whether an ecclesiastical tribunal has exceeded its
lawful powers, and that the action of one of those tribunals is conclusive in a legal controversy, not only as to the merits of the
question it may have decided, but also as to its power and jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute, and of the parties
concerned, until such action shall have been reversed, annulled, or
modified by some higher church judicatory.
This is not a new question in this court. The rule by which the
legal tribunals are guided in cases of this character was thus stated
in the case of Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush 332 :"While we recognise the principle as firmly established that civil
courts cannot and ought not to re-judge the judgments of spiritual
tribunals as to matters within their jurisdiction, whether justly or
unjustly decided, we cannot accept as correct the principle contended
for in argument for the appellees, that whether the synod had jurisdiction and power over the subject on which it acted under the presbyterial system is a question purely ecclesiastical, to be settled by
the Synod itself and the General Assembly. Such a construction
of the powers of church tribunals would, in our opinion, subject
all individual and property rights confided or dedicated to the use
of religious organizations to the arbitrary will of those who may
constitute their judicatories and representative bodies without regard
to any of the regulations or constitutional restraints by which,
according to the principles and objects of such organizations, it was
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intended that said individual and property rights should be protected," and that "when rights of property, which are secured to
congregations and individuals by the organic law of the church,
are violated by unconstitutional acts of the higher courts, the parties thus aggrieved are entitled to relief in the civil cour'ts as in
ordinary cases of injury resulting from the violation of a contract
or the fundamental law of a voluntary associatiohi."
This rule was again announced and elaborated in the case of
Gartin v. Penick, 9 Am. Law R-eg.'N. S. 210, s. c. 5 Bush 110.
But our attention is called to the fact that the doctrine of these cases
was rejected and repudiated by the Supreme Court of the United.
States in the case of Iratson v. Jones, 13 Wallace 679.
There are various reasons why we should not allow the rules of
property or of individual rights under the protection of the laws
of this state to be shaped and controlled by the principles of that
opinion. The then chief justice and Mr. Justice NELSON did not
participate in the consideration or the decision of that case, and the
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary was denied by Justices CLIFFORD and DAVIS, and their position is sustained by the weight of
authority.
Then we deny without .qualification the rights of the federal
courts to set up and enforce within the territorial limits of Kentucky a rule of property affecting title to real estate,. different from,
and subversive of, the laws of this Commonwealth as construed and
expounded by this court. The Constitution of the Supreme Court
of the United States "requires it to follow the laws of the several
states as rules of decisions whenever they apply. And the habit
of the court has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial
tribunals upon questions arising out of the common law of the
state, especially when applied to the title to land :" Beauregard v.
.ew Orleans, 18 Howard 502.
And in the case of Gellpcke v. Caty of -Dubuque,1 Wallace 177,
where this rule was not observed, the court felt constrained to say :
"We are not unmindful of the importance of uniformity of the
decisions of this court, and those of the highest local courts, giving
constructions to the laws and constitutions of their own states. It
is the settled rule of this court to follow the decisions of the state
courts." And the reason why the decision of the Supreme Court
of Iowa was not followed, in that case, was because that court had
changed its opinions as to the constitutionality of certain state leg-
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islation, and thus destroyed the alleged rights of parties who had
contracted upon the faith of an older and different opinion.
And even under that state of facts, Mr. Justice MILLER declared,
in a dissenting opinion, after a full and careful review of all the
cases, that the advance then taken by the Supreme Court was in
the direction of a usurpation of the right belonging to the state
courts to decide as a finality upon the construction of state constitutions and state statutes.
The questions involved in the &ase of Watson v. Jones, affected
the title to, and the use of real estate, and were dependent upon the
proper construction of the statutes, and the common law of this
state. They had been fully investigated and finally decided by the
state courts, and the effect of the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court in that case was to approve a re-trial of the same issues,
between substantially the same parties, and of the rejection of the
construction of the laws of this state adopted by its own courts, and
of the practical reversal by the Federal Circuit Court of the decision
of the highest judicial tribunal of a sovereign state.
And it was not attempted to justify or excuse this departure from
the precedents of the Supreme Court, by showing the existence of
any single fact deemed sufficient to constitute an exception to the
general and well-established practice of that court.
Under these circumstances it was not to be expected the majority opinion in the case of Watson v. Janes would become a controlling precedent. And we very soon find the Supreme Court
returning, and (except in a few professedly exceptional cases),
afterwards steadily adhering to the ancient and almost universal
rule, that the decisions of state tribunals, as to the true construction
of their own laws, are binding upon the federal judiciary: ltlker
v. State Harbor Commissioners, 17 Wall. 648; Galphi v. Paye,
18 Id. 350; Bailey v. 3IllcGuire, 22 Id. 215; and Secombe v. The
Railroad Company, 23 Id. 108.
And it will also be seen by an examination of the case of Bouldin
v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131, that the Supreme Court substantially
abandoned the ruling in Watsoa v. _ones, as to the power of secular
courts to pass upon the jurisdiction of bodies of persons claiming to
act as ecclesiastical.courts; and actually inquired into the constitution and manual of the Baptist Church, and decided as matter of
church law that the minority of the members of a Baptist congregation have no power. under the constitution of their church, to
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remove trustees from office, or to exclude other persons from membership; and, finally, that the attempted exseinding of the majority
of the members by the minority, who were in the possession of the
church edifice, and who claimed to constitute the true body of the
church, was wholly inoperative and void. And as to the removal
of the trustees, the court said the attempt was a nullity, because it
is "certain that they cannot be removed from their trusteeships..
by a minority of the church society or meeting, without warning,
and acting without charges, without citation or triat, and in direct,
contravention of the church rules."
It is thus made plain that the federal court looked into theconstitution and rules of the church, and decided against the ecele-'
siastical power of this minority to remove trustees, just as-this court
examined the constitution of the Presbyterian church and decided
that the Synod and General Assembly had no ecclesiastical power
to make valid and binding the irregular and unauthorized action of
certain members of the Walnut Street Church in the appointment of
ruling elders, who were to participate in the management and control of the property and temporalities of that congregation, by pr6:
ceedings'unknown to, and impliedly prohibited by, the fundamental
law of the general church.
It is true that in Bouldin's case the Supieme Court intimates
that there is a difference between churches having a general organization with ecclesiastical tribunals possessing certain general and
ultimate powers of control, and churches where the congregations
are strictly independent of their ecclesiastical associates. But this
difference does not authorize the application to the one class of
churches of a principle radically different from that applied to the
others. The congregational churches and their members are as
free from, and as independent of, secular control 'as the churches
held together by general organizations. And if the shadowy distinction under consideration does not owe its prominence to the
necessities of the case of Watson v. Jones, it is certain that it can
no more be upheld and maintained on principle, than can the insinuation, or rather the charge, made in the majority opinion in that
case to the effect that the three upright and learned judges who
joined in the decision of this court in ratson v. Avery, were 'capable, "under cover of inquiring into jurisdiction" of the Synod and
General Assembly of the Presbyterian church, of re-trying the
merits of the controversy, and of substituting their own judgment
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for that of their ecclesiastical tribunals, can be regarded - as suited
to the dispassionate dignity" of the Supreme Court of the United
States, or " as resmetful to another court of at least concurrcnt
jurisdietion over the matter in question."
We are satisfied that the difference in the organization of the
various churches can work no difference in the principle by which
legal tribunals are to be governed when required to deal with the
action of ecclesiastical bodies, and we do not doubt our power to
inquire into the organization of the board of reference, and to
decide whether it acted without the scope of its constitutional jurisdiction. It was called into existence, and organized and acted
under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of canon 4, title 2, of the
Digest of the Canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States. Said canon provides as follows:"§ 1. In case of a controversy between any rector or assistant
minister of any church or parish, which cannot be settled by themselves, the parties, or either of them, may make. application to the
bishop of the diocese, who shall thereupon notify each of the contesting parties to furnish him with the names of three presbyters in
the diocese. The bishop shall add to them the names of three
other presbyters, and the whole number shall then be reduced to
five by striking .off the names alternately, by each of the contesting parties. Should either party refuse or neglect to name
three presbyters, or to strike from the list as aforesaid, the bishop
shall act for the parties so refusing or neglecting. And in all the
proceedings aforesaid, the vestry or congregation, as the case may
be, shall be represented by some layman of their number, duly
selected by them for the purpose, provided that the party or parties
applying as above shall have first given the bishop satisfictory assurance of compliance with whatever may be required of them as the
final issue of such proceedings."
"§ 2. The five l)resbyters thus designated shall constitute a board
of reference to consider such controversy; and if, after hearing
such allegations and proofs as the parties may submit, a majority
of the presbyters shall be of opinion that there is no hope of a
favorable termination of such controversy, and that a dissolutionu
of the connection between such rector or assistant minister and his
parish or congregation is necessary to restore the peace of the
church and promote its prosperity, such presbyters shall recommend
to the bishop that such minister shall be required to relinquish his
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connection with such church or parish on such conditions as may
appear to them proper and reasonable."
Appellant insists that the proceedings to be had before a board
of reference are in the nature of an arbitration; that the members
of the board are arbitrators, and that the submission of the matters
in dispute being to the five members jointly, -they must all act
together, and must each and all be present, and participate from the
commencement to the conclusion of the proceedings.
The board differs in many regards from a board of arbitrators, It is an ecclesiastical court, provided for by the laws
of the church, and the parties cannot defeat its action by refusing or declining to submit themselves to its jurisdiction. It is
charged with the duty of settling a question of church policy
and its recommendations to the bishop as to the legal rights of the
parties rest upon, and are incident to; its primary power to deterz
mine whether the connection between the rector and the parish
should be dissolved. In passing upon the primary and purely ecclesiastical question, the board is a church court, and in no sense a
board of arbitrators. But if upon general principles we had a doubt
as to tle proper constitution of the board, that doubt would be removed by the provision of title 3, canon 7, that, "in all cases in
-which a canon of the General Convention directs a duty to be performed, or a power to be exercised by a standing committee, or by
the clerical members thereof, or by any -other body consisting of
several members, a majority of said members, the whole having
been duly cited to meet, shall be a quorum, and a majority of that
quorum, so convened, shall be competent to act, unless the contrary
is expressly required by the canon."
This proi, sion includes boards of reference, and the canon pro-iding for their constitution and organization does not expressly,
or even by fair implication, require that all of the five members
shall act.
We conclude that the board acting in this case was legally organized, and that it kept within the scope of its powers, and hence that
its recommendations, approved as they have been by the bishop of
the diocese, must be respected by the civil tribunals.
Another objection urged to the action of the board is, that the.
canon under which it was appointed was not adopted by the General
Convention of the church until after Dr. Perry had entered into his
contract -with Grace Church. This canon was not intended to, and
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does not operate to give either of the parties a new, nor to take from
either an existing right. It is in the nature of a remcdial statute,
and merely prescribes the manner in which the existence of the facts
authorizing a dissolution of the connection between a rector and his
congregation shall be ascertained, and the terms and conditions of
the dissolution fixed and determined.
As we have already seen, the rights of the contracting parties to
have this relief existed from the beginning, and grew out of the
very nature of their contract; and it seems manifest that in adopting this canon, the convention exercised only a reasonable, necessary, and unquestionable ecclesiastical power.
It was the duty of Dr. Perry to surrender the possession of the
rectory and grounds on the 1st day of June 1872; and the failure
of the appellees to pay him the arrearages due on his salary did not
excuse him from the performance of that duty. The dissolution of
the pastoral connection, and the surrender of the church property
were not made to depend upon the performance by the congregation
of the duties imposed upon it by the board of reference.
The tender of the arrearages of salary to appellant was not good
in law, and did not stop the accrual of interest; but as the reasonable rents of the property wrongfully withheld by the appellant
greatly exceed in amount the principal of the sum due him, with
its accrued interest, we need not discuss that question.
The court below did not err in setting off the rents against the
claim for salary, nor in requiring the appellant to surrender the
possession of the rectory and grounds.
Wherefore its judgment must be affirmed.
Three interesting legal questions are
involved in the decision of the foregoing case.
1. The nature of the contract between
a minister and his church.
2. The power of ecclesiastical judicatories to dissolve the contractual relations entered into between a minister
and a church upon his settlement.
3. How far the civil courts will
enforce rights based upon these ecclesiastical relations and review the decrees
of ecclesiastical courts upon the ecclesiastical status and rights of the parties.
As preliminary to the discussion of
these questions, it may be remarked,
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that the relation our religions institutions hear to the state are so different
from the relations established in the
country from which we derive the hody
of the common law, that no certain rule
of decision for us can be derived from
the study of English ecclesiastical cases
Robertson v. Bullons, 9 Barb. 64.
1. The American cases, arising as
they do in several of the different denominations into which the American church
is divided, show very clearly that among
them all the contractual relation established between a minister and a congregation upon his settlement over them is
a permanent relation, and can not be
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dissolved by either party of their own
motion without the consent of the other.
This conclusion necessarily follows from
the fair construction of the words of the
call, or invitation usually sent by a congregation to a minister with whom they
desire to establish this relation. The
call sent in the principal case is substantially like the call extended to a
minister in all the churches. It is in
form a request, from the congregation
to the minister, to settle himself over
them, to devote himself to the work of
the ministry in accordance with the rules
of the church with which the congregation is connected; the congregation
promising, in return therefor, to give
him a competent livelihood and support.
In some portions of the New England
states where the congregational form of
church polity prevails in connection
with the political divisions of towns, the
call is extended by the congregation
and town jointly at a town -meeting.
In Arery v. Tyrringhan, 3 Mass. 160,
which was an action by a minister
against a town for services rendered by
him as a minister thus settled over the
town, the defendant offered in evidence
u resolution of the town adopted at a
town meeting previously to the services
-declared for, in which they resolved,
'without stating any reason, that they
-would no longer consider the plaintiff
,their minister. This evidence was ex-eluded by the court, upon the principle
:already stated that the contract was
'permanent, and could not be dissolved.
-by the town by a simple resolution. In
Gibbs v. Gilead Sciety, 38 Conn. 153,
-and Wirreli v. Church, 23 N. J. Eq. 96,
-the same principle is recognised. In
*thelatter case, the church held a mort,gage of,$2000 upon the residence of
their minister. Difficulties having
:arisen between the people and the minister they agreed to release the mortgage
'if he would resign. Upon the faith of
'this promise he did resign, and it was
-held,.thatithe resignation being a volun-

tary act was a sufficient consideration
to support the promise of a release.
An injunction restraining proceedings
upon the mortgage was granted. There
is quite an elaborate discussion of the
status of a clergyman of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the St. Clement's
Church case, . Phila. 251, where an
injunction was granted to restrain a
vestry from ejecting -a rector from a
parish without & formal trial according
to the canons of the -church, the court
saying, "Can a rector be dismissed
without his consent by virtue of the
charter and by-laws of St. Clement's
Church, or by Nirtue of any canonical
law or laws whatever of binding force
in the Protestant Episcopal Church? * *
Can it be possible that any minister
may be summarily ejected from his
parish without a. trial? Shall the ,law
guarantee to the humblest citizen ai
hearing, and may an ordained and duly
institut6d minister be denied a right as
common as this 'ne? I
I tamof
*opinioii that tnder the existing laws
of the church, the civil contract cannot be broken without an accus ation
and trial."
2. Though the settlement of a minister
over a congregation is theoretically for
life, and though he cannot be dismissed
by the congregation without his consent,
it is obvious that occasions will arise
when congregations may properly ask
to be relieved from the continuance of
a relation when owing to supervenient
causes not in contemplation at the time
of settlement, a minister cannot, or will
not, any longer perform the duties- of
his office to the profit and edification of
the church, and though the congregation
may not be permitted to judge when that
condition of affairs exists, it is in the
nature of things necessary that there
should be a tribunal before whom such
questions can he settled. As the calls
extended to ministers are usually in
form an invitation for a settlement for
the performance of the work of the min-
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istry in accordance with the constitutions of the church with which the particular congregation is connected, and
as these constitutions provide judicatories and tribunals for the trial of disputes arising between ministers and congregations, it is not necessary to go
beyond the terms of the contract. In
cases where the contract does not contain an express reference to these constitutions, it has been repeatedly decided
that there is an implication that the
contract has been made subject to them.
Hence, although a congregation cannot
at their own pleasure dismiss a minister
regularly settled over them, if the minister can no longer perform the duties
of his office to the profit and edification
of the church, a complaint may be presented to the proper ecclesiastical judicatory, and after having it before them,
if proper cause is shown, the relation
will be dissolved. The doctrine was
recognised in Avergi v. Tyrringhant,
supra,where the court, after denying the
right of the congregation to dissolve the
relation, said, "In a proper case an
ecclesiastical council will be called, and
their decision is binding," and in Gibbs
v. Gilead Society, supra, it was said.
"The contract was in the form usually
adopted, and it is undoubtedly true that
such settlements are by implication for
the work of the gospel ministry according to the polity of the congregational
denomination of Christians, and subject
to their platforms, constitutions and
usages, and the contract for the payment
of salary is dependent upon the existence of the pastoral relation, and ceases
to be operative whenever that relation
ceases to exist. The relation though
theoretically formed for life can be
severed for cause by the formal action
of the consociation with which the
The most elabchurch is connected."
orate discussion of the rationale and
necessity of this doctrine will be found
in the case of Connitt v. R.formed Dutch
Church, 4 Lans. 339 ; 54 New York 551.

Connitt, a minister of the Reformed
Dutch Church, was settled over a church
at New Prospect. In consequence of
certain internal troubles a majurity of
the congregation presented a petition
to the classis asking for a dissolution of
the relation, which petition after hearing was granted, an appeal was taken
by Connitt to the General Synod of the
church, hut the decree of the classis was
sustained. In a subsequent civil action
against the church for the amount of
his salary, Connitt denied the power of
the clurch judicatories to dissolve the
pastoral relation. The court, after reviewing at length the constitution of
the church with its organized series of
church courts, consistories, classes, particular synods, and general synods, and
the subjection of the ministry in their
ecclesiastical relations to the decrees of
these bodies as they appeared at large
in the canons, said, "It was clearly intended to provide by means of the four
judicatories a complete system of ecclesiastical government and discipline for
the churches and congregations and all
their officers, in order that the doctrines
of the church might be faithfully taught,
order preserved, and the prosperity and
the growth of the church promoted.
The classis has complete and full ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the pastors
and churches within its bounds. If it
has not, where has such jurisdiction
been lodged. It cannot be doubted
that it was intended to be vested in
some or all of the church judicatories.
If it was not, then the form of church
government provided was incomplete.
While the classis has power to license,
ordain, suspend and depose ministers to
and from congregations, and to supervise the teaching of doctrines therein,
and while no pastor can be called or
dismissed to another congregation withcut its consent, can it be supposed that
the power to dissolve the pastoral relation is lodged nowhere ?
"There are numerous reasons not
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affecting the religious or moral character of a pastor, such as the condition
of his family, his own weaknesses,
foibles, manners, eccentricities, infirmities of temper or mere indiscretions
which might render his services ineffectual for good and possibly productive
of evil in a congregation. In such
cases the exigencies may be such that
the very life and existence of the church
depend upon his removal. Strife and
bitterness may hbve been so far engendered that they are irreconcilable. The
flock may have been so far scattered
and diminished that the consistory cannot pay the pastor's salary. What can
be done in such a case? As I understand the claim of Mr. CoTinitt, there is
no remedy, unless the pastor will consent to a dissolution of the pastoral
relation; the consistory alone cannot
effect it, and there is no jurisdiction in
any of the church judicatories to effect
it. Cobsidering the general frame of
the church government, the objects to
be attained thereby, the distribution and
division of the various powers among
the several judicatories, and the oversight and care of the churches within
its bounds conferred upon classis, I am
of opinion that it had inherent power
to dissolve the pastoral relation. This
relation and the manner in which the
pastor discharges his duties, involving
the spiritual welfare of the congregation
and to some extent the character of the
church organization, are proper subjects
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction."
In The Dutch Church of Albany v.
Bradford, 8 Cowen 457, where a minister, subsequently to his settlement
over a church, had fallen into habits
of intemperance, which rendered him
incompetent of performing his pastoral
duties, in consequence of which he was
suspended by the classis, the court
refused to admit evidence offered for
the purpose of contradicting the finding
of the classis, and further held, that in
an action to recover arrears of salary
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for the period intervening between the
presenting of the complaint to, and the
decree of suspension by, the classis, he,
having during that period, according to
the finding of classis, been incapable
of properly performing his pastoral
duties, was not-entitled to any salary,
the court saying: "A contract t6 act
as minister of the Reformed Dutch
Church, for which the particular church
pay a stated salary, founded upon
is ,to
a call referring to the rules of church
government established at the Sypod
of Dort, is not an exception to the
general rule which makes performance,
or ability and readiness to perform a
contract of labor, a condition precedent
to the price becoming due."
When, however, a congregation is
entirely independent of the supervision
of any superior ecclesiastical judicatory, as in the Associate Presbyterian
Church, the presbytery, being a mere
voluntary body having no legal constitutional powers, cannot deprive a congregation of a minister with whom they
are satisfied without theli -consent:
Smith v. Nelson, 18 Verm. 511 ; and
where the charter of a 3 utherau congregation, which is independent of all
superior ecclesiastical judicatories, invested the board of trustees of the corporation with the power of selecting a
minister, a court of equity will not
enjoin them from preventing a minister
from exercising the functions of his
office, who was elected to the office
of pastor by a majority of the congregation, contrary to the will'of the
trustees. -Lawyer v. Capperly, 7 Paige
281.
In Church v. Clark, 25 La. Ann.
282, the charter of a Free AfricanChurch, investing the trustees of the
church with the power- of selecting a
minister, was held to render them independent in this matter of the control
of the Bishop of Louisiana, who appointed a minister of his own selection
over them.
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3. The third question relating to the
power of the civil courts to re-examine
questions passed upon by ecclesiastical
courts, presents greater difficulties, and
has been the subject of somewhat different opinions, as is seen from the
foregoing opinion ; and yet a careful
examination of thefacts in the cases
criticized will show that the confusion
which has been introduced into this
branch of the law has resulted more
from an occasional perhaps'too lroad
statement of principles on which cases
have been decided, when the principle
is stated without a reference to the facts
upon which the principle stated is predicated, than any inherent difficulty in
the subject itself. Probably the clearest
short statement of the true rule upon
this subject is found in the opinion of
Chancellor JoHso-T, in 11armon v.
Dreher, 2 Speer's Eq. Cas. (S.C.) 82 :
right depends upon an
c,When a civil
ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court
and not the ecclesiastical which is to
-decide, and the civil tribunal tries the
civil right and no more, taking -the
ecclesiastical decisions out of which the
civil right arises as it finds them."
The civil courts will not undertake,
under any circumstances, to enforce
rights purely ecclesiastical : as, for example, the right to be admitted to the
communion; or redress wrongs purely
ecciesiastical: as, for example, the excommunication of one found by a
church- tribunal to be an unworthy
member.
In SZhannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253,
it was said: "The court having no
ecclesiastical jurisdiction can only pass
on questions of property, not on questions of church discipline. We cannot
decide who ought to be members of the
church, or whether the excommunicated
have been justly or unjustly cut off.
The excommunication is conchtsive
proof that the persons expelled ale not
And in Scibert v. Cl,,rch,
members."
3 Burr 282, where the charter of a

church provided that none but members
of the church should be corporators, one
of the members having been tried and
excommunicated, asked for a mandanmus
against the church torestore him to his
standing as a member of the corporation, upon the ground that the trial had
not been conducted in accordance with
the constitution of the church. This
the court refused to grant, saying :
"The church judicatories consist of
three heads-the consistory, the clasis
and the synod ; and by the sixth article
it is provided that- when any person
may think himself aggrieved by the
decision of a lower judicatory, he has a
right to appeal to a higher, and whatever is concluded in such judicatory by
a majority of votes is valid and binding,
unless it can be shown to be contrary
to the word of God and the constitution
of the church. The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial
tribunal, are final, as they arc the best
judges of what constitutes an offence
against the word of God and the discipling of the church. Any other than
those must be incompetent judges of
matters of faith, discipline and doctrine,
and civil courts, if they should be so
unwise as to attempt to supervise their
judgments on matters which come
within their jurisdiction, would only
involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt, which would do anything but improve either religion or
good morals." It was, however, intimated in the opinion that if a church, in
supreme
defiance of the decrees of tile
judicatory, should refuse to admit a
member to exercise his rights as a corporato-r, a mandamus would be granted,
and in the case of Gren v. African I.
F. Chtrcch, I S. & R. 254, a return to a
mandamus to compel the respondents
to restore the relator to his rights as a
corporator, was held insufficient, which
set up that the relator had been tried and
expelled by a select number of the
society, and in the presence of three
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deacons and a preacher; but it was not
shown of how many this select number
consisted, or by what authority they
proceeded to try and expel a member.
So also in People ex rel. Dutcher v.
&. &ephme's Curch, 6 Lans. 172, one
who had been expelled from a church
organization sought by a mandamus to
be restored to his rights as a corporator.
The court said : "With the action of a
church as a religious body we have
nothing whatever to do, and we decline
altogether to enter upon any review of
its action in expelling the relator from
the church, acting as a religious body.
We have power to regulate the proceedings of the church corporation as a legal
being only, and if it has deprived the
relator of any of his legal rights as a
member of the corporation, it is our
duty to compel them to reverse their
action and restore him to the enjoyment
of such rights."
The enforcement of purely ecclesiastical rights and' the investigations of
questions of faith, discipline and doctrine, is a branch of English ecclesiastical law which happily has never been
incorporated into our system, and which
never can be while the American church
and state maintain their independent
relations. For a very curious and interesting case, showing the extent of the
English jurisdiction in this matter, see
Jenkins v. Cok, Law Rep. 4 Ad. & Ec.
463, and 1 Pro. & Div. 80. But though
our courts refuse to entertain jurisdiction
in the class of cases already mentioned,
yet in cases where a civil right, as the
right to the p'ossession of church property, or the right to the payment of a
sum of money as salary for services rendered under a contract with an ecclesiastical body, the machinery of the law
will be set in motion. If, however, the
civil right, which is the subject of adjudication, is based upon or springs out
of some ecclesiastical right or relation,
which has been the subject of adjudica-

tion in an ecclesiastical court, the finding
of that court will be taken as an established factor in the cause. This doctrine
is recognised and enforced in Connitt v.
Church, supra, "The relation of pastor
and people is purely ecclesiastical, and
the ecclesiastical tribunals alone have
cognizance of it. The civil contract is
necessarily a conditional one, dependent
upon the existeace and continuance of
the ecclesiastical relation. The church
at New Prospect is attached. to thaieli-_
gious denomination known as the Reformed Church in America, and is
under the ecclesiastical order and government of said church. The tall, pursuant to which Mr. Connitt became the
pastor of the church at New Prospect, is
based upon that fact, and the undertaking
of the consistory of that church to pay
him a salary of t800, and allow him
the use of the parsonage so long as he
shall continue the minister oftbechurch,
is in subserviency to the ecclesiastical
rule, and the continuance of the relationship between him and the church is
dependent "upon the administration of
such rule by the ecclesiastical judicato.,
ries. While the civil courts have jurisdiction over the civil contract by which
Mr. Connitt is entitled to his salary and
the use of the parsonage 'they have no
jurisdiction over the relation of pastor
and people and cannot lengthen or
abridge its continuance. 'We cannot
fail to see that the pastoral relation
established in this case was as purely
ecclesiastical as that in which Mr. Connitt stood as minister in the Reformed
Church of America. His -rights and
duties as minister and as pastor were
ecclesiastical, not civil, and the ecclesiastical courts alone could suspend or
depose him from the ministry or dissolve
the pastoral relation which existed
between him and the church. His duties
as minister when placed over this church
were of a character peculiarly within
the cognizance of the authorities of the
church organization to which he be-
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longed, and were to be performed in
pursuance of the rules and usages of
that organization ; as minister and pastor he was amenable to no other organization, and such organization, through
its different instrumentalities, consistories, classes and synods, had entire control of both pastor and people in all ecclesiastical matters. The secular courts
have no jurisdiction over the ecclesiastical rights of either pastor or people,
and neither can resort to those courts for
the protection or enforcement of those
rights. The fact that the civil contract
is subsidiary to this relation does not
serve to bring this within the jurisdiction of the civil authorities. We
cannot inquire whether the church judicatories have proceeded according to the
laws and usages of their church, nor
whether they have decided the matter
correctly. It is the settled law of this
country that in such cases the civil
courts must take the decisions of the
ecclesiastical courts as final and binding
upon the parties." In Baptist Church
v. Wetherill, 3 Paige 296, Chancellor
WA i.WORTHi said, " Over the church ns
such the legal or temporal tribunals of
this state do not profess to have any
jurisdiction whatever, except so far as
is necessary to protect the civil rights of
others and to preserve the public peace.
All questions relating to the faith and
practice of the church and its members
belong to the church judicatories, to
which they have voluntarily subjected
themselves. But as a general principle
'those ecclesiastical judicatories cannot
interfere with the temporal concerns of
the congregation or society with which
the church or the members thereof are
connected."
To the same effect is
Miller v. Gable, 7 Paige 281, 2 'Denio
492. In the celebrated case of Chase v.
Cene., 10 Am. Law Reg. 295, 58 I1.
509, an injunction to restrain an ecclesiastical court regularly organized according to the canons of the Protestant
Episcopal Church from trying the complainant for an alleged departure in dec-

trine from the standards of the church,
was refused.
How far the civil courts will inquire
into the jurisdiction of a body professing
to be an ecclesiastical tribunal with
power to determine ecclesiastical disputes may as yet be a somewhat open
question. In Watson v. Jones, 11 Am.
Law Reg. 430, 13 Wall. 679, the court,
although admitting that adjudications
by ecclesiastical courts upon questions
not ecclesiastical are of no force, proceeded to say, "But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of
dispute strictly and purely ecclesiastical
in its character-a matter over which
the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction-a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church
to the standard of morals required of
them-becoymes the subject of its action.
It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it,
or that in its judgment it exceeds the
powers conferred upon it, or that the
laws of the church do not authorize the
L)articular form of proceeding adopted ;
and, in a sense often used in the courts,
all of those may be said to be questions
of jurisdiction. But it is easy to seo
that if the civil courts are to inquire
into all these matters, the whole subject
of the doctrinal theology, the usages
and customs, the written laws and fundamental organization of every religious
denomination, may and must be examined into with minuteness and care, tbr
they would become in almost every case,
the criteria by which the validity of the
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil courts. This principle would deprive these bodies of the
right of construing their own church
laws, would open the w-iy to all the
evils which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of Lord ELDON
in Attorneyj-Gen,'ral v. Pearson. 2 Bligh
529, and would in effect transfer to th
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civil courts where lroperty rights were
iftvolved the decision of all ecclesiastical
questions." The case which called
.forth this opinion was to determine
;,hith of two conflicting bodies were
tl true session of a Presbyterian church
-in Kentucky, and as such session entitled
to the possession of the church edifice.
In lVatson v. Farris,45 lio. 483, a case
arising out of the same unfortunate controversy between the northern and
southern branches of the Presbytcrian
Church, commonly known as the "declaration and testimony controversy,"
a quo warranto was sought for to determine who were the legal trustees of
Lindenwood College, an institution
under the care of the Presbytery of St.
Louis. The General Assembly of the
church had passed upon the question,
and in this action an attempt was made
to have thnir decision rendered inoperative ; tle court, however, said, "The
General Assembly is the highest court
or judicatory known to the Presbyterian
Church; it possesses extensive original
and appellate jurisdiction, and whether
the case in the matter of the declaration
and testimony signers was regularly or
irregularly before it was a subject for it
to determine for itself, and no civil
court can revise, modify or impair its
action in a matter of purely ecclesiastical concern. The utter impolicy of
the civil courts attempting such interference is apparent. It would involve
them in difficulties and contentions,
and impose upon them duties which are
not in 'harmony with their proper functions."

the church or of persons who were not
the chiirch, and who consequently had
no right to excommunicate others.
And thus inquiring we hold that the
action of the small minority by which
the old trustees were attempted to be
removed and by which- a large number
of the church members were attempted
'to be exscinded, was not the action of
the church, and that it was wholly inoperatiYe. In acongregational church
the majority, if they adherc to the organ•ization and the doctrines, represent the
chtirch. The expulsion of a majority
by a minority is a void act."
In GarinT. Penick, 5 Bush 110, a
case involving the question which of
two contending parties, one adhering
to the Northern, the other to the
Southern Presbyterian Church, was
entitled to the possession of a church
edifice, the court said, "From the pleadings and the proofs the judicial deduction is inevitable, that, the appellants
and appellees constitute separate and
antagonistic churches, each claiming to
be the church to which the property in
litigation was dedicated, and consequently the question now tobe decided is
one of identity, involving in its solutioii
the equitable title to property dependant
on contract which this court must, when
as in this case appealed to interpret and
uphold, as well between ecclesiastical
as civil bodies or any other parties.
The contract is purely civil and not ecclesiastical, and the usufructuary rights
resulting from it depend on the laws of the land and not on the arbitrium o4 the
General Assembly, which has no civil
In Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. power, but within the limits of the polit131, however, the complainants showed ical and ecclesiastical constitutions has
a prima .facie title as trustees of an supreme and final jurisdiction over
African Baptist church, the defendants church doctrines and discipline. The
answered that the complainants had been jurisdiction of the civil tribunals over
expelled at a regular church meeting;
church property does not, therefore,
but the court, following Green v. African conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction
Church, supra, held that this answer did of the General Assembly in the plenitude
not prevent an inquiry " whether the of its ecclesiastical power, either legislative or judicial. Without interfering
resolution of expulsion was the act of
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with religious liberty this court could
not control, or mould the faith .or doctrines of the church, nor could it consistently with the spirit of our institutions
authoritatively settle questions of orthodoxy or optimity among professing
Christians. But so far as the identity
of the respective claimants with tile
beneficiary to whom the church property
was dedicated may be affected by their
doctrines or by the acts of the General
Assembly the essential coincidence of
the doctrines and the legal effect of thoso
acts must necessarily be considered for
the purpose of deciding the question of
title to the property, without concluding
the General Assembly in any way in its
own proper jurisdiction in its ecclesiastical domain."
In McAutley's Appeal, 27 P. F. Smith
397, a case involving the title to certain
real estate, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in reviewing and holding
void a decree of the synod dissolving
the Presbytery of Philadelphia, said,
" That the decree of the synod which
sought to accomplish this result was
unlawful and revolutionary will the
more fully appear upon consideration
of its legitimate powers. These are
of two kinds, legislative and judicial.
Under the first it might have dissolved
the Presbytery of Philadelphia, and
assigned its churches to some other
existing presbytery, or to such new one
as it might choose to erect. Under the
second of the powers it might, for proper
cause and in due form, depose any of its
presbyters, or dissolve any of its churches
and reorganize them. We mayconcede
that the first, in the case mentioned,
might he exercised arbitrarily, for that
involves but a matter of churchopolity
which from its very nature must rest
largely in the discretion of the Superior
Court, but the exercise of the second in
such manner involving as it necessarily
must important civil rights cannot be
tolerated. Had the synodical decree
which we are asked to enforce been
VOL. XXVI.-6

founded upon some semblance of'legal
'process it might have been sustain;jl,

but, as it is *;,holly without such foundation, it must be regarded as nl.gatory."
This case would seem to folloWy the.
doctrine of the Kentucky cases, as ,istinguished from M'utson v. .Jones, supra.
The court, however, were not unanimous, AGxEW, C. J., and SIIAaswooi),
J., delivering dissenting opiaults (2
Weekly Notes of Cases 77), in which
they said: "Tile synod had acted
within the general powers already
quoted from diocipline, to direct its
memhers, to supervise inferior judicatories, to direct the exercise of liscipline throughout every part, to examine
the proceedings of inferior judicatories,
to ascertain whether they faithfttly discharge their duties, &c. And even
admitting that they may have acted in
these matters irregularly, yet it was
upon matters within their just powers,
and therefore not ipso facto void and to
be contemned or disobeyed. The synod
was the proper and only judge of its
own members and their qualifications.
If they erred in the mode of their
action or proceeded irregularly still
they acted upon matters within tleir
authority, and their acts were not absolutely void, deserving of contempt and
to be disobeyed. * * * The synod was
tlle highest judge of its own order, and
if, in the opinion of the preshytery, it
did not proceed correctly, it did not
become tle presbytery to fly in the face
of its superior and suspend their relations thereto."
The majority of tle
court in this case may have deemed well
founded the distinction which was made
in the argument between this case and
rtson v. .nes, that in the latter ease
the pleadlings put in is-ne only the
titles of tile elders as ecelcsia-tical
officers, while in the case before them
the right to the possession of real estate
was the matter of dispute.
There are several interesting qtestions which may be here noticel as
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bearing collaterally upon the questions
discussed. Lucas v. Case, 9 Bush 297,
was an action for libel against a committee of the church of which the plaintiff was a member, and before whom he
had been summoned to answer a charge
,of immorality. 'the committee found
him guilty of the charge and so reported.
The court held the action could not be
maintained, saying, "In pronouncing
the result of their deliberations, in reporting the same in writing to the church
they will be protected by the law, if
they acted in good faith and within the
scope of their authority. Whether in
what the church did it acted right or
wrong, this court cannot approach its
precincts to inquire, and is powerless to
redress any alleged wrong inflicted on
the plaintiff thereby. By becoming a
member of the church he subjected himself to its ecclesiastical power, and neither this nor any earthly tribunal can
supervise or control that jurisdiction."
1cMlliean v. Birch, I Binn. 178, was
an action of slander. The defendant, a
Presbyterian minister, having been cited
by the plaintiff, also a minister, to answer
before presbytery for unchristian conduct and teaching, in his defence before
the presbytery called the plaintiff " a
liar, drunkard, and preacher of the
devil," and it was held that as the words
had been spoken in a quasi court of
justice, without any evidence of express
malice, they were in the nature of a
privileged communication and not
actionable.

Dieffendorf v. The 1eformcd Church,
20 Johns. 12, was an action against a
subscriber to recover the amount of his
subscription to the support of a minister.
The defendant offered to show that the
minister was a man of immoral character, but as it appeared that this charge
had been preferred before a church judicatory and by them tried and dismissed,
the evidence was not admitted.
The signing of a subscription paper,
whereby the defendants agree to contribute the sums severally affixed to
their names for the support of a minislter, does not render them jointly liable
for the whole salary, but each one may
be sued for the amount of his individual
subscription : Riddle Y. Stevens, 2 S. &
R. 537.
But, though the decrees of ecclesiastical courts may not be reviewed by the
civil courts, when the subject-matter of
the decree is ecclesiasticali- if an ecclesiastical court undertakes to legislate in
affairs purely temporal, their proceedings are purely ultra vires and void, as
when a board of reference, appointed
under the canons of the Protestant
Episcopal Church, endeavored to adjust
certain pecuniary disputes which had
arisen between a rector and his parish,
on account of money advanced and
expended by the rector in the construction of a chapel. An award by the
board in a case of this kind is of no
force at all: Bradburyv. Birchmore, 117
Mass. 569.
R. C. D., JR.

Supreme Coupt of Vermont.
DORAN v. SMITH.
Infancy is a bar to an action on the case for false and fraudulent representations
by a vendor or pledger as to his ownership of property sold or pledged.

CASE. The declaration alleged, that the defendant at, &c., on,
&c., intending to deceive and defraud the plaintiff, and to induce
him to purchase a certain gold pin then and there in the hands and
possession of the defendant, did falsely, fraudulently, and deceitfully
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represent to the plaintiff that said pin was then and there the property of the defendant, and that he had title thereto, and good right
and lawful authority to sell the same; that the plaintiff, confiding
in the said affirmation of the defendant, and believing the same to
be true, then and there did buy said pin of the defendant, and pay
him therefor the sum of fifteen dollars; that the defendant was not
the owner of said pin, and had no title to nor interest in the same,
and no right nor authority to sell the same to the plaintiff, but said
pin was the property of another person, to wit, &c., and that said
owner reclaimed said pin, and took it from the possession of the
plaintiff, whereby, &c.
The declaration also contained a count alleging the transaction
as a pledge, with like false and fraudulent representations, and a
count in trover.
Defendant pleaded infancy, and plaintiff demurred. The court
overruled the demurrer, and adjudged the plea sufficient; to which
the plaintiff excepted.
Nicholson & Baker, for the plaintiff, cited Schouler's Dom. Rl.
56.3; 2 Kent Com. 241; Badge v. Pinney, 15 Mass. 359; Elwell
v. Alartin, 32 Vt. 217; Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441; Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355; Wallace v. JM1ores, 5 Hill 391; West v. -1foore,
14 Vt. 447 ; Walker v. Davis, I Gray 506; Fasse v. Smith, 6
Cranch 226; Homer v. Thuoug, 3 Pick. 429; qreen v. Sperry,
16 Vt. 320 ; Baxter v. Bush, 29 Id. 465; Mathews v. Cowan, 59
Ill. 341; Gilson v. Spear, 38 Vt. 311.
Warren H. Smith, for the defendant, cited Gilson v. Spear, 38
Vt. 311; Graves v. lNeville, 1 Keble 778.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PIERPOINT, C. J.-This action is brought against the defendant
to recover the damage which the plaintiff claims to have sustained
in consequence of the defendant's having made false and fraudulent
representations to him as to his, the defendant's, title to and ownership of certain property which the plaintiff, relying upon such representations, purchased of him and paid him therefor, when in fact
the defenidant had no title whatever to the property. The defendant
pleads infancy, and the plaintiff demurs to the plea.
The representations alleged in the declaration are of the same
character, and stand upon the same principles, as representations as
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to the quality of the property-they enter into and constitute an
element of the contract itself; it is that that makes them actionable.
The contract must be alleged and proved, or there can be no recovery. The contract is the basis of the actio: ; the fraud is predicated
upon the contract. This being so, this case comes clearly within
the case of Gilqon v. Spear, 88 Verm. 811, and must be governed
by it. It is there decided that in cases like the present, a plea of
infancy is a full defence. The subject is so fully and ably discussed
by Judge KELLOGG, in the opinion in that case, that to enlarge upon
it here would be a waste of time.
Judgment affirmed.
This decision seems to be well supported both by principle and authority.
That a minor is liable for .his pure
torts, unconnected with any contract, as
assault and battery, slander, trespass to
real or personal property, &c., is elementary law.
That he is not bound on his ordinary
contracts, unconnected with any tort, is
equally clear. The difficulty arises when
there is a combination of a contract and
a tort.
On the one hand it is asserted that
if the tort is an inherent part of the contract, inseparable from it, and not a
distinct, independent act, either preceding or subsequent to the contract,
the minor is not liable tort-wise, if he
would not have been held contract-wise
on the same state of facts.
It was on this ground that an infant
innkeeper was held not liable in tort for
the loss of his guest's goods, when he
was protected by his infancy from a
suit on contract for non-delivery of the
same goods : Crosse v. Andross, Mich.
40, 41 Eliz. B. R. ; stated in 1 Rolle
Ab. 2, Action sur case, D. 3.
So an infant carrier who did not
deliver the goods according to the agreement, was held not liable for them in
the admiralty court. Pasch., I1 Car. B.
R. ; F.rnes v. Smith, I Roll. Ab. 530.
So too, if in a sale of goods, he falsely
and fraudulently represents that he owns

them, or that they are of a different
kind and character from what he knows
them to be, he is not liable in tort for the
fraud ; for that is an inherent part of the
contract. Without the contract there is
no actionable fraud against any one, as
the fraud without the contract would be
harmless ; and as the infant may avoid
the entire contract, he may also escape
from the fraudulent part of it ; since the
incident falls with the principal. This
was the old case of Grove v. Nville, I
"eb. 778 (16.64) ; directly followed in
Gilson v. Spear, 38 Verm.,311 (1865)
Heath v. 3lahoney, 7 Hun 100 (1876).
So too, if a minor hire a horse to drive
from A. to B. and within that distance
he injures the animal by careless overdriving, he cannot be sued in tort, inasmuch asit was but the careless manner
in which lhe was executing his contract,
and as be could not be 'aed on the contract to return him in good condition,
he will not any more be liable for the
same act when set up by the plaintiff as
a tort. Jennings v. Piundall, 8 T. R.
335 (1799), recognised as sound law in
8 Exch. 146. See also Eaton v. Hill,
50 N. H. 235 (1870) ; Afoore v. Eastman, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 37 (1874).
&chenck v. Strong, I South. 87, recognises the same rule, although there is
reason to believe that there was also a
tort in that case outside of and beyond
the contract, for which the minor might
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have been liable in some form of action.
So, if in a sale of goods he fraudulently warrants the same, he is not
liable in tort for the deceit, because it
was au integral part of the contract,
and as the contract is altogethervoidable
the fraud goes for nothing : Green v.
Greenbank, 2 Marsh. 485 (1816) ; IVest
v. Moare, 14 Verm.447 (1842); Prescott
v. Norris, 32 N. H. 101 (1855). He
is not liable for such an act, when sued
in tort, simply because he would not be
liable contract-wise, notwithstanding the
fraud : Morrill v. Aden, 19 Verm. 505
(1847).
On tile other hand, if the tort is a separate, independent fact, or a wilful act
outside of the contract, the infant has
been held liable for it, although the
opportunity to commit it may have been
in consequence of some contract.
Thus if goods be bailed to him for a
specific purpose, and contrary to his
instructions he wilfully converts them
to his own use, he is liable in trover
therefor, although they came into his
possession in virtue of a previous contract: as when a supercargo, in violation
of his instructions to sell the goods at
Norfolk, Va., shipped them to the West
Indies in the name of a third party,
it was held, that, although not liable on
contract for breach of his instructions,
he was liable in trover for the conversion: Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch 226
See also Mills v. Graham, 4
(1810).
B. & P. 140, that trover would lie, if
an infant bailce refuses to re-deliver the
goods when the bailment is ended.
So, it was held in Hfomer v. T,,ing,
3 Pick. 492 (1826), that if an infant
hires a horse to drive from A. to B.,
and he drives to C. and injures the animal by over-driving, he is liable in
trover for the conversion, although he
came into .possession of the property
under a contract with the owner, and
although it was contended by the defendant that the action was founded on contract, and the defendant could not be
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ousted of his defence by changing the
form of action from contract to tort.
A similar result was arrived at in Towne
v. Miley, 23 Verm. 355 (1851), and in
1ih v. Ferris,5 Duer 49 (1855), though
1ilt v. |1elsh, 6 Watts 9, is contra.
So, in Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend.
139 (1828), it was held that if an infant
wilfully and intentionally beats and
cruelly treats an animal bailed to him
so that it dies, he is liable in tort, notwithstanding the contract of bailment;
since his wrongful act terminates the
bailment. But if the same result is
caused solely through the infant's Iunskilfulness, want of knowledge, discretion and judgment," his infancy is a
complete defence, since the duty to exercise such care and skill is a matter of
implied contract from the fact of" bailment; and as he is not liable contractwise, he could not be as for a tort.
In Lewis v. Littlefield, 15 Maine 233
(1839), the plaintiff put money into a
minor's hands, a stakeholder, to abide
the result of an illegal wager. After
notice from the plaintiff not to pay it to
the winner, he did so; and it was held
he was liable in trover to the depositor,
notwithstanding the money came into
his bands by consent of the plaintiff and
under a contract with him to pay it to
the winner ; but it is to be noted that
the contract itself was tainted with illegality.
In Green v. Sperry, 16 Verm. 390
(1844), a minor borrowed a watch of
the owner's wife, but without any authority in her to lend it, and neglected
to return it for an unreasonable time
after a demand, and he was held liable
*in trover, notwithstanding his infancy,
on the ground of a conversion, and that
there never was any valid contract by
which he came into possession of the
watch.
In Baxter v. Bush, 29 Verm. 465
(1857), an infant had taken a lease of
a farm, with a stipulation therein that
the lessor should have a lien on all the
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crops and produce as security for the
rent. Ie did not pay the rent, converted the crops to his own use, and refused to deliver them on demand of the
lessor: Held, liable in trover for their
value.
In like manner in Barnard v. Haggis, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 45 (1863), a minor hired a mare merely for a ride and
expressly not to be used for jumping
fences ; he allowed his friend to ride the
mare, and in jumping a fence she fell
upon a stake which caused her death.
It was held, that the infant was liable in
tort: WILLES, J., saying, "It
appears to me that the act of riding the
mare into the place when she received
her death-wound was as much a trespass,
notwithstanding the hiring for another
purpose, as if, without any hiring at all,
the defendant had gone into a field and
taken the mare out and killed her. It
was a bare trespass, not within the object and purpose of the hiring. It was
not even an excess. It was doing an
act toward the mare, which was altogether forbidden by the owner."
And in Eaton v. Jill, 50 N. H. 235
(1870), it was maintained with much
force of reasoning, that whenever the
tort is wilful, as when an infant bailee
wilfully uses the property for a different
purpose, wrongfully sells it, or refuses
to return it on demand, this determines
the contract of bailment, and the infant
is liable, like an adult, either in trover
for the conversion, or in an action on
the case. This decision seems to put
the liability on the true ground, and
holds that the liability of the infant
depends not upon the form of the action,
but upon the fact whether the tort was
merely constructive, or an actual, positive and wilful act of the infant.
Thus we have two classes of cases
arriving at directly opposite results. It
has been suggested that this distinction
between the adjudged cases exists in
consequence of a difference in pleading;
that the form of the action determines

the liability; and that an action nn the
case for the tort will not lie, because the
declaration in that action shows on its
face that the tort is merely constructive,
being but in effect a breach of contract ;
and, therefore, that infancy is a complete defence either when pleaded in
bar, or shown in evidence under the
general issue. Whereas trover might
lie on the same state of facts, because in
trover the nature of the liability does
not appear from the declaration; and it
cannot be told whether the action is
brought for a pure tort, or such merely
constructive conversion as consists only
in a breach of contract. That may be
so, if the action should be decided
wholly upon the pleadings ; as, if infancy
should be set up by a plea in bar, towhich the plaintiff demurs. In such
case if the declaration is in trover or
trespass the plea would not set up an
absolute and universal defence; whereas
if the declaration is in case, disclosing
the contract and a breach of it, infancy
would be a good plea. But if infancy
is relied on at the trial by way of evidence, it is not easy to see why it should
not be as available, if the action were
trover, as if it were case. In either
the plaintiff does not recover upon the
strength of his declaration, but upon the
evidence, and evidence of infancy should
have the same effect in both forms of
action.
The difference between these two
classes of cases seems to he rather in the
mode of setting up the defence of infancy
than in the effect of it when proved.
In declarations on the case disclosing
the contract, if it therein appears to he
a mere breach of contract, and so only
a constructive tort, infancy may be
safely relied upon as a plea in bar, to
which a demurrer could not well be
taken. But if, on the other hand, the
declaration be in trover or trespass, a
plea of infancy in bar is not safe, since
as it is not a defence to all such actions,
the plaintiff might demur; and the more
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proper way therefore would be to plead
the general issue and give the fact of
infancy in evidence under it. This was
the course approved in Vtsse v. Smith,
supra. But the question of liability
ought not to depend upon the mere form
of the declaration, but upon the nature
and character of the act done.
The most satisfactory rule then seems
to be that a minor is not liable either in
case orin trover for a mere constructive
tort to property lawfully in his possession under a contract, such as a mere
Careless overdriving a horse within the
limits contracted for, or neglect to give
him food or water; but if he wilfully
commits a positive tort outside of and
beyond his contract, as by driving beyond
the place for which he had hired him, or
by cruelly and wantonly killing him, or
selling him, though still within the time
and limits of his contract, he is liable,
and in the same form of action as would
be proper against an adult in like circumstances.
Or, perhaps, the rule may be safely
stated thus : when the tort of an infant
is of such a nature that an action of
contract, as well as tort, would lie therefor against an adutt, the infant cannot
be held liable either in trover or on the
case, since he would not be on the contract; but when the tort is such that
trover or trespass only, and not an action
of contract, would lie against an adult,
the infant may be charged in tort, as it
becomes a pure and absolute tort, and
nothing more or less.
Thus, for a default as innkeeper, carrier or other bailee, for a false and
fraudulent warranty or affirmation in a
contract, an adult may be liable contract-wise as well as in tort, and for such
wrongs the infant is liable in neither
form; but for wilful and positive injury
to property bailed, for using it for a
purpose entirely different from that contemplated in the bailment, by selling it
as his own, by refusing to re-deliver it
after the bailment is terminated, trover

is the proper remedy against an adult,
and in such cases the infaut is liable as
well, and in the same form ot action.
So, if an adult bailee mi.uses a hired
horse on the journey, an action on the
case will lie : Rotch v. Dane,, 12 Pick.
136 (1831 ) ; but if he drives him beyond
the agreed distance, sells him or wilfully kills him, trover or trespass and
not case is the proper remedy: Wheeloce
v. theelright, 5 Mass. 104; MVoodman
v. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67 (1852) ; Penrose v. Curren, 3 Rawle 351 ; Lucas v.
Trimball, 15 Gray 306. In the former
case the infant is not liable in tort, in
the latter he is.
The question still remains upon the
application of this rule to a particular
state of facts. Is a minor liable to an
action for deceit in falsely and fraudulently representing himself to have been
of full age, and so induced the plaintiff
to have entered into a contract wlihh
he has subsequently avoided to the plaintiff's injury ? That such fraud does not
at law estop the minor when sued on
the contract from setting up his infancy
and does not make him liable, on the
contract, is abundantly settled : Bartlctt
v.
'ells, I B. & S. 836; DeRoo v.
Foster, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 272 ; Brown
v. MfcCne, 5 Sandf. 224 ; Merrimn v.
Cunningham, I1 Cush. 43 ; Studwe'l v.
Shafter, 54 N. Y. 249 ; Buxley v. lussell, 10 N. II. 184.
And because he could not be held
upon his contract, but might avoid it,
fraud and all, it was very early helhl he
could not be muleted in an action of tort
for the deceit. Such was the early case
of Johnson v. Pie, 1 Sid. 258 ; I Lev.
169 ; I Keb. 905-913, the report of which
is stated in Stikeman v. Dawson, I DeG.
& Sm. 113, and it has been often approved both in England and in this
country. See Fairhurst v. Addphi Loan
Association, 9 Ex. 429 ; Price v. Hewitt,
8 Ex. 146; Brown v. McCune, 5 Sandf.
224.
On the other hand the Supreme Court
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the former owner may retake them by
replevin, as having never parted with
his property in them, because of the
fraud: Badger v. Phinney; 15 Alass.
in an action of deceit: that the decep- 364 ; Mills v. Graham, 4 B. & P. 140.
tion was anterior to the contract and And Walkerv. Davis, I Gray 506, seems
the f6undation of it, but not an integral
to hold that if the minor has sold the
part pf it; the inducement to, but not property so frdudulently obtained, he
the contract itself.
is liable in trover for the conversion.
And this case was approved and folThis may often be an inadequate
lowed by the Court of Common Pleas remedy, of course, and the distinction
in the city of New York : Eck-tein v. between compelling the defendant to
Frank, I Daly 334 (1863). See also surrender the goods on a writ of
Kilgore v. fordan, 17 Tex. 350 (1856).
replevin, or compelling him to pay for
But whichever he the rule as to the them in an action for deceit, is not very
infint's liability to an action o/'damages broad, but it seems to result from the
for the fraud, it is clear fliat if he still principles governing the contracts of
has the goods he has obtained by such infants.
fraudulent representations as to his age,
EDMItND H. BENNETT.
of

,New lIampqhire, and with much
strength of' reasoning, held in Fills v.
11011, 9 N. H.'441 (1838), that in such
a case an inthnt was liable for the fraud

SuPreme Court of Bhode Island.
LYMAN UPIAM v. HUGH HAMILL.
A mistake which will entitle a party to relief in equity must be a mistake
of fact, without negligence on his part.
Where facts are known, or might be known except for negligence, the ignorance
of legal consequences is not a mistake of fact for which equity will grant relief.
A purchaser at an execution sale cannot in equity be excused from consummating his purchase, because, never having attended such a sale before, and not hearing the terms of the sale, he supposed himself to be buying the entire estate in
question, and not the "right, title and interest ' of the judgment debtor in it.

AssuIIPSIT.

On demurrer to equitable plea. The plaintiff, who

was a deputy sheriff, sued the defendant for refusing to complete

his purchase of certain property which was struck off to him at an
execution sale. The property was all tie right, title and interest
which one Charles Stafford had in certain real estate on the 23d
September 1875, and the 7th October 1875, being the days when
the property was attached on the original writs in the actions in
which the executions issued, under which the sale was made. At
the time of the attachments the estate was mortgaged for $1000,

and continued under mortgage until after the execution sale.

The

defendant, who was plaintiff in the earlier action aforesaid, claimed

that he bid, at the execution sale without having heard the terms
of sale, if any were announced, and that, having never before
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attended such a sale, he supposed his bid was to cover the entire
estate, and that he would be entitled to the sheriff's deed upon
crediting the excess of his bid over tile mortgage upon his execition, which he offered to do when the plaintiff tendered the deed.
He set this up in a special plea, by way of equitable defence under
the statute: Pub. Laws, cap. 563, § 3, April 20th 1876. The
plaintiff demurred to the plea.
Charles .E. aorman, for plaintiff.
Dexter B. Potter, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURIFEE, C. J.-If the mistake alleged is to be regarded as a
simple mistake of fact, which had the effect of preventing a meeting of the minds of the parties at the sale, it would, in the absence
of any matter of estoppel, be a good defence even at law and under
the general issue : i5heldon J-Barton v. Cayron, 8 R. 1. 171. The
special plea, however, is not objected to on this ground. The
question submitted is, whether. the mistake is such as would have
entitled the defendant to relief in equity.
The plea shows that the defendant knew of the mortgage, and
he must be presumed to have known that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff could sell no more than the debtor's interest in the estate,
or, in other words, could only sell the estate subject to the mortgage. Indeed, the plea implies that he knew as much as this, but
supposed, notwithstanding, that his bid was to cover the whole
estate, and that the amount of the mortgage would be deducted
afterwards. It was rather a strange mistake, and one which would
have been corrected by reading the advertisement, or by the slightest
inquiry. He does not allege that anything was said or done to
mislead him. His only excuse is that he had never before attended
an execution sale, and that he did not hear the terms of sale, if any
were announced. He does not assert that they were not announced.
His mistake, then, was an erroneous supposition, for which nobody
was to blame but himself, and which, with the most ordinary care,
he might have avoided. If he is released, the result will be that
not only his bid, and other bids, if made, but the attachments
themselves, will be lost, practically at least, for the plea avers that
the property has been sold under the mortgage. Can he be permitted thus to visit upon others the consequences of his own culVOL. XXVI.-7
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pable negligence or inattention ? Clearly not in equity, for equity
does not grant relief to a party on the ground of accident or mistake, if the accident or mistake has arisen from his own gross negligence or want of reasonable care, and especially if relief to him
will harm another: 1 Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 105, 146; Penny v.
M11artin et als., 4 Johns. Ch. 566 ; Wood v. Patterson, 4 Md. Oh.
335; Taylor v. Fleet, 4 Barb. S. C. 95; Capelhart v. Moon, 5
Jones Eq. 178 ; Kesler v. Zimrnerscldtte, I Tex. 50. The defence
set up by the special plea should be treated here as it would be
treated in equity. Possibly if the plaintiff were suing the defendant in equity for specific performance, the court might refuse to
enforce the bid, but its refusal would be without prejudice to the
remedy at law: lJIalinsv. Freeman,2 Keen 25. We think, therefore, that the special plea must be disallowed, and the defendant
must be left to such defences as are available to him under the
general issue.
Demurrer sustained.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
FICKEY

ET AL.

v. LONEY

ET AL.

Mhe assignment of a judgment or other like chose in action, where the legal
effect of the contract is not to vest the legal title in the assignee, can only be perfected *asagainst the debtor or party bound to pay, or his creditors, by notice given
to such debtor or party bound, that such assignment has been made.' .
This rule, however, does not apply where hotes or other evidences of debt have
been actually delivered.
If the possession is not changed, and apparent ownership still with the assignor,
so that lie is enabled to hold himself out as owner of the paper, and if the debtor
pay in good faith to the assignor thus in possession, he will be protected.

TN EQUITY. Appeal from decree. A. L. Stamps, a resident of
Bedford county, Tennessee, was indebted to various Baltimore
merchants. He made an assignment of real estate to Edmund
Cooper as trustee for their payment, 1st of December 1860, the
property being valued to the creditors at upwards of $1200, but the
notes were not to be given until all encumbrances on the property
were discharged. Stamps was indebted to Mercer & Reese, of Baltimore, in the sum of about $1800, due by promissory note, and this
was one of the debts intended to be arranged by his deed to Cooper.
IMercer & Reese made an assignment on the 20th of February
1861, to complainants as trustees, of all their property, real, personal, debts, c'hoses in action, &c., which was duly registered in
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Maryland, the 22d of February 1861. Loney & Co., merchants
of Baltimore, who declined to take under the last-named deed of
trust; in 1863 recovered a judgment against Mercer & Reese, and
on the 2d of January 1868 filed their attachment bill at Shelbyville against said firm, Edmund Cooper, the trustee, and Stamps,
the debtor of Mercer & Reese, seeking to subject so much of the
debt of Stamps, due said firm, as would satisfy their judgment.
At June Term 1868, a decree was had in favor of Loney & Co.,
for $647.50, the amount of their debt, and this amount due from
Stamps and secured by the deed of trust, ordered to be applied to
the discharge of the decree. Stamps, under this decree, paid or
settled the amount with Cooper, who was the attorney of Loney &
Co., as well as trustee, and who still holds the money.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FREEMAN, J.-The complainants allege that they are entitled to
this money as assignees under the trust deed of Mercer & Reese,
in preference to Loney & Co., the creditor of the firm, under his
attachment and decree. It is proper to add that the claims of
Mercer & Reese, evidenced by note, had been placed in the possession of Mr. Cooper in 1860, when the Stamps deed was made to
him as trustee, and remained so in his hands up to the time of his
filing the attachment bill.
The grounds on which the complainants claim this fund are, that
the deed of trust to them transferred the debts to them as trustees,
and. being registered in Baltimore, where Loney & Co. resided, it
was notice to them of such assignment before filing their attachment bill, and also that they probably had actual notice. A demurrer was filed to the bill on the ground that the bill did not allege
notice of the assignment to Stamps, the debtor, or Cooper, the trustee*
This was by the chancellor overruled, and raises the question on
which the case turns.
The law is settled in our state that the assignment of a judgment
or other like chose in action, where the legal effect of the contract
is not to vest the legal title in the assignee, can only be perfected
as against the debtor or party bound to pay, or his creditors, by
notice given to such debtor or party bound, that such assignment
has been made. See Cqodfelter v. Cox, I Sneed 338-9; Sugg
v. Powell et al., 1 Head 222. The latter case, however, holds that
in case of a promissory note where it was transferred and delivered
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as indemnity to a party bound for another, no notice of the transfer
was necessary. In other words, the principle has no application
to the actual transfer and delivery, or actual negotiation of negotiable paper, or, in the language of Judge ANDREWS, in case of
aavoso Savings In8t. v. Fellows et al., 6 Cold. 741-2, it has no
application where a note, bond or bill or like evidence of debt is
assigned and is transferred by actual manual delivery to the
assignee, and this whether the legal title in this class of instruments
passed by the assignment or not. If, however, the possession is
not changed and apparent ownership still with the. assignor, so that.
he is enabled to hold himself out as owner of the paper, it would
be fraudulent as against creditors and subsequent purchasers in
good faith. And if the debtor pay in good faith to the assignor
thus in possession, or has submitted to judgment on garnishment,
he should be protected: Id. 472. The principle thus laid down is
applicable to the- present case. Here the debtor Stamps, having
no notice of the deed of trust to complainant, the note evidencing
the debt against him being in the hands of Mr. Cooper in Tennessee,
the agent of Mercer & Reese, or rather trustee, submits to a decree
against him on the attachment bill, and has actually paid the money
over to Cooper, as attorney of the attaching creditors. We hold,
under such circumstances, the payment is valid, and the creditor
can hold the money thus received, for if Stamps could rightfully
pay it, the other can rightfully receive it. We need n6t discuss or
examine the law of Maryland on this question, as the rule of comity
would not require that we should enforce that law to the injury of
our citizens in a case like the present, and we deem the rule
necessary for their protection in paying debts under such circumstances. Reverse the decree of the chancellor and enter a decree
4ere in pursuance of this opinion. Costs to be paid by complainant.

Circuit Court of the United States. Brester .Distrietof Xissouri.
JAMES McCORD IT AL. V. MARVIN B. WcNEAL, AssIoNEE, &c.
An attachment of the property of a debtor on mesne process is ipso facto dissolved by a deed of assignment made in bankruptcy, if the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced within four months after such attachment. (Rev. Stats.,
sect. 5044, sect. 14 of original act.)
In such a case the assignee's right is superior to the right of the attaching creditor, although the attached property had been sold before the commencement of
the bankruptcy proceedings and the proceeds paid over to the creditor after the

adjudication, but prior to the date of the deed of assignment.

MoCORD v. McNEAL.

EpRRO 'to the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri.
This was a suit brought in the District Court of the United
States, by McNeal, as assignee of Broughton & Co., bankrupts,
against McCord, Nave & Co., to -recover certain moneys received
by them from the sheriff of Clay county, Kansas, the same being
the proceeds of the sale of certain personal property of Broughton
& Co., which had been attached by McCord, Nave & Co. (the plaintiffs in error), in a suit brought by them against Broughton & Co.,
in the District Court of said Clay county, and which, pending the
suit, had been sold by the sheriff, under an order of said state court.
It was agreed that the facts were as follows:On September 2d 1874, F. D. Broughton and D. N. Fulton were
co-partners as merchants, under the firm-name of F. D. Broughton
& Co., at Clay Centre, Kansas. They were indebted to the defendants, McCord, Nave & Co., in the sum of $1072.39, and interest,
for merchandise. On that day the defendants instituted suit against
Broughton & Co., on their demand, in the District Court of Clay
county, Kansas, caused an attachment to issue, and the property
of Broughton & Co. to be seized under the attachment. In the
month of September the attaching creditors procured from the District Court, under the provisions of the statutes of Kansas, an order
for the sale of the property attached, and on October 6th, under
this order, the property was sold by the sheriff of Clay county for
$908. The summons in the civil action was personally served upon
the defendants, Broughton and Fulton, on the day it was issued,
September 2d, and was returnable September 12th. The defendants, Broughton and Fulton, wholly made default and never answered.
On October 9th 1874, certain creditors of Broughton & Co., constituting the requisite number, filed in the District Court of the
United States, for the district of Kansas, a petition to have Broughton and Fulton declared bankrupts, and under this petition, on
October 28th, the adjudication of bankruptcy regularly passed.
On November 18th 1874, at the regular term of the District
Court for Clay county, final judgment, in the civil action and on
the attachment, was rendered in favor of McCord, Nave & Co.
against Broughton & Co., for $1107.24, and an order made by the
court to pay proceeds of attached property to the plaintiffs in the
judgment. Under this order, the sheriff on December 15th 1874,
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after deducting $90 of costs, paid over to the judgment creditors,
the defendants in this action, $818.
On December 28th 1874, the plaintiff in this suit was appointed
assignee in bankruptcy of Broughton & Co., and on same day the
regular assignment was made by the register in cbarge; the plaintiff being the present and sole assignee in bankruptcy of Broughton
& Co.
The proceeding by attachment was not collusive between MeCord,
Nave & Co. and the bankrupts, nor was it in any way procured by
the bankrupts.
The proceeding in bankruptcy was not suggested in the civil
action, nor in the attachment proceedings. The assignee never
intervened in the District Court of Clay county, to claim the proceeds
of the attached property. The petitioning creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings had knowledge of the civil action and proceeding
by attachment, but made no suggestion of the bankruptcy proceedings to the court.
The defendants had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in bankruptcy a few days prior to the adjudication.
The plaintiff, on 8th February 1875, demanded of defendants the
payment of $1042.39, which defendants refused to pay.
On these facts the District Court rendered judgment for the
assignee for the sum of $818 and interest from February 8th 1875,
to reverse which the defendants prosecuted this writ of error.
John K. Cravens, for the plaintiff in error.
Gage " Ladd and Karnes & Ess, for the defendant in error
(the assignee).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DILLON, Circuit Judge.-In the case of Bracken Y. Johnston, 4
Cent. Law Jour. 9, it was decided, by Mr. Justice -MILLER, that a

creditor who proceeds in a state court, by, a writ of attachment, on
which he seizes the property of his debtor, and collects his judgment obtained in such suit by a sale of the property attached, is
liable to the assignee in bankruptcy of the debtor, appointed under
proceedings commenced in the bankruptcy court, within four months
of the levy of the attachment, although the assignee did not appear
or defend the attachment suit, or make any attempt to arrest the
attachment proceedings. The case just cited was deliberately con-,
siderod, and it may not be improper to state, as illustrating the
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difficulty of the question involved, that the record in that case was
laid before the judges of the Supreme Court, and that they were
equally divided. I had decided the same principle in Bradley v.
Frost, 3 Dillon 457.
In the argument of the present case, the learned counsel for the
plaintiffs in error admitted that these cases were within section
5044 of the Revised Statutes, and decisive against him, unless the
case can be distinguished. He insists that this case can be distinguished from those on the ground that, under section 5044, it is
the deed of assignment which relates back to the commencement
of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and which has the effect to dissolve any attachment of property on mesne process, made within
four months next preceding the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceedings. In this case the property attached had been sold,
pending the suit in the state court, three days before the petition
in bankruptcy was filed, and the money, which was the proceeds of
the attached property, was actually paid over to the creditor, by
the order of the state court, before the assignment was made,
although the date of such payment was after the institution of the
bankruptcy proceedings, and after the adjudication of bankruptcy
had passed. It is admitted by the counsel for the creditor, that if
the property attached had not been sold prior to the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, the case would fall within 1B3acken v.
ohnston, and that the assignee in bankruptcy would be entitled to
recover. But he claims that, having been sold before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, it was not "t1h en attached"
(sect. 5044), that is, was not under attachment at the time the
bankruptcy proceedings were instituted, and that the order of the
state court to pay the proceeds to the creditor on his judgment is
valid and effectual as against the assignee.:
It is my opinion that this narrow distinction cannot be maintained.
The proceeds of the attached property stand in the place of the property attached, and these proceeds, or the right to them, passed to
the assignee by virtue of the assignment, which related back to the
commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, at which lastmentioned time the money was in 'the custody of the state court,
the same as the property had been, out of which the money arose.
I may add, that I submitted to Mr. Justice MILLER the point
here made by the counsel for the creditor, and that be was of opinion
that no solid distinction, in this respect, could be found between the
Affirmed.
present case and that of Bracken v. JohTnston.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
STOREY V: KREWSON ET AL.
Where mutu'al acts are to be done by two parties at the same time, and the right
of each depends upon the performance of the other, either may tender performance of his part on condition of the simultaneous performance of the other's part,
and such tender will be good. But when one party is bound to perform an act
not dependent on any act of the other, atender to be valid must be without conditions.

A tender of the amount due upon a promissory hote payable at a bank, made
upon the condition that such note shall be surrendered, is sufficient, but if the note
be secured by a mortgage on real estate, a tender of the amount upon the condition that such mortgage shall be released or cancelled, is insufficient.
Section 5 of the Indiana " act concerning mortgages," approved May 4th 1852
(2 R. S. 1876, p. 333), requires a mortgagee of lands to enter satisfaction thereof

only upon his having received, not a tender merely, but full payment, of the debt
secured thereby.
Ox error from the Marion Superior Court.
On December 1st 1873, Mary C. Henderson and Jaines .M. Henderson made their joint promissory note, payable seven months
after date, to Harrison Owens and Narcissus Owens, for $500, with
interest, negotiable and payable at Fletcher & Sharpe's bank, in
Indianapolis, without relief, &c., and at the same time executed a
mortgage, conveying to the payees of the note a certain tract of land
therein described, to secure payment of the note. Harriqon Owens
endorsed the note and mortgage, in writing, and Narcissus Owens
assigned the same, by delivery, to John W. Moore, who endorsed
the same to the appellants. In July 1874, the Hendersons sold
and conveyed the lands described in .the mortgage to Krewson and
Myers, who, as a part of the purchase-money, assumed the payment
of the note made by the Hdndersons to the Owens, secured by the
mortgage on the same lands. The appellants brought this suit to
recover upon the note, and to foreclose upon the mortgage, making
Krewson and Myers, and Narcissus Owens, who had assigned the
note and mortgage merely by delivery, defendants to their complaint.
Krewson and Myers answeret, admitting the note and mortgage
and that they had purchased the land, and assumed the payment
of the note; alleging that they made certain payments on the note,
and in 1874 called upon the appellants and were informed by them
of the balance due; and that, thereupon, at the same time and
place, these defendants counted'out and handed to these plaintiffs
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the sum claimed as due in full payment and satisfaction of said note
and mortgage; that plaintiffs then and there took said money,
handed them by defendants, counted -the same, and remarked to the
defendants that it was all right and satisfactory, and- they wouldaccept the same in payment of said note and mortgage. Defendants
then and there demanded the surrender of said note, and the cancellation of said mortgage ; whereupon the plaintiffs offered to surrender said note, but, wrongfully, fraudulently, for the purpose of
oppressing these defendants by the bringing of this suit, refused to
cancel, or have cancelled, said mortgage; the defendants refusing
to make payment except upon the condition named, then made a
tender upon the same condition, &c. Plaintiffs demurred to the
sufficiency of the answer, but the demurrer was overruled, and
judgment entered for plaintiffs for the amount tendered, without
interest, and judgment for defendant for costs. To reverse the latter
judgment the plaintiffs brought the case to this court.
G. W. Riclardson and L.

. Bichardson, for appellants.

B. A. Parker,for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BIDDLE, J.-Was the tender, made upon the condition that the
appellants should cancel the mortgage, sufficient? This is the
decisive question in the case. In all other respects the tender, as
alleged in the answer, is good.
The appellees insist that they had the same right to demand the
cancellation and satisfaction of the mortgage from the appellants,
as the makers of the note had to demand the same from the payees
and mortgagees, in case the note had been paid by them; that the
payment of the note, its surrender, and the cancellation of the mortgage, were simultaneous acts, neither of which could be demanded
without the performance of the other; and cites to us Story on
Promissory Notes, sections 106 and 107, and the notes .thereto.
Neither Mr. Story, nor the notes, nor the authority cited, support
the appellees, any farther than as to the surrender of the promissory
note upon tender of payment being made. They say nothing about
the cancellation of a mortgage.
When mutual acts are to be done by two parties, at the same
time, and the right of each depends upon the performance of the
other, either may tender his part of.the performance, upon the conVo. XXVI.-8
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dition that the other performs his part; and neither is compelled
to perform his part unless the other performs his part also; as when
land is bargained and sold, to be conveyed upon payment of the
purchase-money. In such a case, neither can be compelled to perform his part of the agreement except on performance by the other
of his part; that is, the vendee cannot demand the conveyance
without tendering the purchase-money;- and the vendor cannot
demand the purchase-money without tendering the conveyance;
and either may make a good tender to the other upon the condition
that he will perform his part of the agreement.
But when one party is to perform an act whose right does not
depend upon any act to be performed by the other.party, the tender
must be without condition; as when' money is to be paid without
condition, the current of authorities-indeed, we believe it to be
quite uniform-holds that the party bound to pay the money cannot make a good tender upon the condition that the party to whom
the money is to be paid shall give him a written receipt therefor;
and in the case of a non-commercial promissory note, the authorities
are in conflict whether a good tender can be made upon the condition that the note shall be surrendered; but in the case of commercial paper, the authorities seem to be uniform that a tender
upon condition that the paper shall be surrendered is good, because
such paper might be put in -circulation after payment, and innocent
parties become liable; not so, however, with non-commercial paper;
after payment by the maker it becomes harmless as against him,
wherever it may go. A tender, to be good, must not be upon any
condition prejudicial to the party to whom it is made.
The mortgage is merely the incident to the note. The payment
or satisfaction of a note secured by a mortgage is a full and complete
discharge of the mortgage. According to the rules above expressedand we believe they are correct and well sustained 'by authoritythe answer we are considering is insufficient as to the averment of
tender. The acceptance of the money as alleged, and the surrender
of the note, operated as a complete legal discharge of the mortgage
by which the pay'nent of the note was secured, as much so as if it
had been surrendered with the note, released upon the record, or
actually cancelled. The appellees had no right to demand a cancellation of the mortgage as a condition to the tender,-it would in
no way have strengthened their right nor placed them in any better
legal status-for the surrender of the note, upon its payment,

